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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation addresses itself to the problem faced by a robot 
in recovering from failures during execution of a task. Failures occur 
partly because sensory information is inaccurate, partly because 
effectors do not always perform as expected, and partly because the 
domain in which the robot operates cannot be characterized exactly. 
Robot systems with automated planners have traditionally dealt with the 
problem of error recovery by merely replanning to achieve the desired 
goal, without attempting to characterize the failure in any way 
whatsoever. 
The central idea in this thesis is that planning recovery from 
failures has its own special techniques, distinct from those used in 
conventional planning systems. 'IWo viewpoints, looking at the past for 
an explanation of the failure, and looking at the current situation to 
attempt a characterization of the failure state, provide powerful 
heuristics for error recovery. This thesis suggests that these 
heuristics can be formalized as failure reason analysis and multiple 
outcome analysis, ·and that knowledge relevant for such analysis can be 
provided through a failure reason model and a multiple outcome model 
associated with each action. 
'Il1e 
knowledge 
failure reason model 
about why actions 
provides a means for representing 
fail, like bumping into an object to be 
grasr.ed because of servoing errors or because of inaccurate information 
about the location of the object. The model also provides knowledge 
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required for distinguishing between the different reasons for failure. 
Finally, it includes recorrunendations of corrective actions to be taken 
if failure is attributed to a specific reason. This model in used in 
failure reason analysis in building a failure tree representing possible 
explanations of the failure. The explanations represented in the tree 
are then used in planning recovery.' 
The multiple outcome model provides a way of representing the 
possible outcanes of an action, like bumping onto the object or bumping 
onto the ground in the immediate vicinity of the object, ignoring the 
fact that these outcomes could be the result of several different 
reasons. Knowledge required to distinguish between different outcomes 
is provided as part of the model. In cases where the immediately 
available information is inadequate to identify the outcome of an 
action, the multiple outcome model provides a basis for executing 
actions to serve as information gathering steps. 'llle novel feature here 
is that information gathering is directed by specific expectations about 
the state of the world. 
A computer implementation of a program called MEND has providea a 
medium for exploring the above idea. MEND has been designed to automate 
recovery from failures in simple manipulation tasks to be performed by 
the JPL robot, but the techniques used in MEND have greater generality. 
A first implementation of MEND established the basis of this 
investigation. A second version, which has been designed to correct 
some limitations of the first version, has not yet been fully 
implemented arrl integrated with the JPL robot system. 
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The techniques of planning recovery from failures through failure 
reason analysis and multiple outcome analysis are contributions to the 
subject of robotics. r-bre imp:>rtantly, however, the problem of error 
recovery is recognized to be a member of a larger class of problems 
involving knowledge representation and common sense reasoning, both of 
which are core topics in the study of artificial intelligence. '!he 
solution presented in this thesis makes some new contributions to these 
core topics. 
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INTRODUC'rION 
1.1 PROBLEM DESCRIPI'ION 
A robot performs a task by executing a plan of actions. During 
execution the robot may encounter a variety of unforeseen circumstances, 
some of which prevent successful completion of the task. Even simple 
actions such as reaching out to grasp a rock cannot be guaranteed to 
succeed in the absence of dynamic sensory feedback as in visual 
monitoring of manipulation tasks. The hand may bump onto the rock 
because of manipulation errors or because of erroneous information about 
the location of the rock. Failures such as these occur because sensors 
and effectors are inaccurate, and because the world in which the robot 
operates cannot be characterized exactly. 
0..lr goal is to design a robot in such a way that it can recover 
from failures in a graceful and intelligent manner. Robot systens with 
automated planners have traditionally dealt with the problem of error 
recovery by merely replanning to achieve the desired goal, without 
attempting to characterize the failure in any way whatsoever. 
The central idea in this thesis is that planning recovery from 
failures has its own special techniques, distinct from those used in 
conventional planning systems. The techniques of recovery planning are 
based on knowledge about failures -- why they occur, what can be done 
about them, etc. '!Wo viewpoints, looking at the past for an explanation 
of the failure, and looking at the current situation to attempt a 
- 2 -
characterization of the failure state, provide powerful heuristics for 
error recovery. 
A computer implementation of a program called MEND has provided a 
medium for exploring the above idea. MEND has been designed to automate 
recovery from failures in simple manipulation tasks to be performed by 
the JPL robot, but the techniques used in MEND have greater generality. 
A first version of MEND established the basis of the investigation 
reported here. A second version, which has been designed to correct 
some limitations of the first version, has not yet been 
implemented and integrated with the JPL robot system. 
1. 2 AN OVERVIEW OF MEND 
----------
FJGURE LI 
NON 
Ri:AL TIME (PLANNING) 
COMPUTER 
fully 
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Let us consider an example to illustrate the problems involved in 
recovery from failures, and some of the features of the solution 
incorporated in MEND. The robot hardware that is controlled by MEND 
consists of two TV cameras, a laser rangefinder, a manipulator, and a 
vehicle [Figure 1.1]. Suppose that the robot is given the simple task 
of picking up a rock within irrunediate reach. Performing this task 
involves locating the rock using the rrv cameras possibly using the 
laser rangefinder to augment the camera data) , positioning the hand 
around the rock, and grasping the rock [Figure 1.2]. Assume that the 
hand bumps into the rock when attempting to position the hand around the 
rock. 
l'v\OVE. I'\ AtJI> 
'{"o Gl\.ASP R.OCI::. 
FIGURE t.2 
Any robot system designed to recover from failures must be able to 
detect them. In the above example, the manipulator system triggers the 
failure, bringing MEND into action. In other cases, MEND has to make 
explicit checks of certain conditions to detect whether or not something 
has gone wrong. MEND's execution monitoring is pragmatic in the sense 
- 4 -
that only those conditions that are easy to check on the basis of the 
available information are tested. A consequence of this lack of 
comprehensiveness is that failures can propagate down the plan and may 
be detected only at a subsequent step. This places an additional burden 
on the recovery scheme. At this point we merely note the intimate 
relationship between execution monitoring and error recovery. 
Having detected a failure, MEND is confronted with the problem of 
dealing with the unexr;iected event. Two general heuristics provide 
guidelines to planning recovery. 
1.2.1 Failure reason analysis 
The first heuristic suggests that recovery actions can be found by 
determining why the failure occurred. The process of finding an 
explanation for the failure is termed failure reason analysis. 
Knowledge necessary for failure reason analysis is provided through a 
failure reason model associated with each action. The failure reason 
model represents knowledge about the different reasons for failure of an 
action, the way in which they may be distinguished, and finally about 
what can be done to recover from a si;:>ecific kind of failure. 
MEND represents possible explanations for a failure in a structure 
called the failure tree, an example of which is shown in Figure 1. 3. 
'Ihe tree consists of a linked set of failure nodes and action nodes. 
There are four basic types of fa ilure reasons that are dealt with in 
MEND and they are information errors, 
precondition er~, and constraint errors. 
- . ---
Each failure node is 
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1-0U'cTION 1.0C.I<. 
associated with a failure type and a specific reason for failure. 
Action nodes are linked to an action in the plan being executed. An 
example of an explanation represented in Figure 1.3 is that the goal 
WITHIN-GRASP (node G) was never achieved by action MOVE-HAND-'.IQ-GRASP, 
tiecause of an Op:!rational SERVO-ERROR (node Fl) . 
Analysis of failures can now be thought of as the process of 
limiting the set of all possible explanations to the specific one which 
applies in a particular situation. MEND does this by limiting the set 
of failure reasons to be considered at each action node in the failure 
tree. Preconditions and constraints that have been independently 
verified can be eliminated from consideration as possible reasons for 
failure. More importantly, the distinctive features of the 
manifestation of the failure are used to limit the failure reason set. 
Figure 1.4 shows, for instance, a simple test and the implications of 
its results in eliminating some failure reasons from consideration. 
+ 
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Once an explanation has been found, recommendations of corrective 
steps can lead MEND to successfully planning recovery from failures. 
For instance, if the failure is attributed to SERVO-ERROR [Figure 1.3], 
then recovery can be simply achieved by repositioning of the hand as 
shown in Figure 1.5. 
LoCJl1E ~OCI( 
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1.2.2 Multiple outcome analysis 
The second heuristic ignores the reason for failure and suggests 
that recovery strategies can be found by determining what the outcome of 
an action is. This characterization is formalized as multiple outcome 
analysis and is directed by a multiple outcome model. 
L 
LEFT-TOVCH f\\G-Hr-ToUCJ-1 
Continuing with our example, MEND finds from the multiple outcome 
model that some of the p:>ssible outcanes of f(>sitioning the hand around 
the rock are as shown in Figure 1.6. Either the fingers could have 
bumped onto the object, or the hand could have bumped onto the ground 
because of overshoot. 'Ihe outcomes could be the result of servoing 
errors, object location errors, or a combination of these, but this is 
unimportant for multiple outcome analysis. MEND attempts to find the 
actual outcane of an action when failure has occurred by running a 
series of tests. These tests are based on the fact that each outcome is 
characterized by a set of conditions that must be true or false for that 
situation. To illustrate an example of such a set of conditions is 
shown in Figure 1. 7. 'Ihe important thing to note is that these 
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conditions can be checked on the basis of immediately available 
information. 
L!;;F'T TOOC..f.( SE~o~ oN 
~IG+rr IOl)CK Si:NSoft.. CANNOT Sf AC.TIVA-TED 
L HAN!> ON OB:fEC:r 
'Ille available information may not always suffice . to identify the 
failure state. In such cases the multiple outcome model directs ME.'ND in 
the execution of actions to collect the necessary information. Figure 
1. 8 shows a simple action and its functions in distinguishing between 
outcomes. 
Ac.:fl"N F1Nt\L STIHE 
LEFT- ~vMP- i£ST 
------t> 
L 
FtGui<..E. \·i 
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Finally, the multiple outcome model includes recorrunendations for 
recovery strategies for each possible outcome. An example of this is 
shown in Figure 1.9. 
L 
<;"EARG{ TO Tfi E Lf.FT 
..... 
l~~ 
101 
1. 3 orHER APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
'llle problem of getting robots to do useful things has been tackled 
in two distinct ways, and each of these approaches has implications for 
the way in which failures are handled. We shall refer to the two 
approaches as the higher level language approach and the planning 
approach. The distinction between the two methodologies becomes blurred 
in certain systems. Nevertheless it is a useful distinction for our 
discussion. 
In the higher level language approach, each robot task requires the 
writing of a program. For instance, in the Stanford Hand-Eye System 
[Feldman 7la, 7lb], every perceptual and manipulation task required the 
writing of a strategy control program. The strategy control program 
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could be designed to deal with failures. However, the system itself had 
no knowledge about failures Qnd how to deal with them. Continuing 
studies at Stanford have led to to the develoµnent of AL [Finkel 74], a 
specialized language for automated assembly tasks. 
can be dealt with by explicit programming for each 
Here again, failures 
task. Subroutines 
can encapsulate some recovery strategies, but incorporating knowledge 
about failures in subroutines has many limitations. For example, it 
becomes difficult (or even impossible) for the system to analyze 
failures an::] attribute the failure to a previous action that did not 
produce the desired result. In MEND such analysis becomes feasible 
because of a more explicit representation of knowledge about failures. 
Consider now the planning approach. Here tasks are specified as a 
goal state to be achieved. An automated planner finds a sequence of 
steps to achieve the goal. In systems of this sort, failure during 
execution can be dealt with by replanning from the failure state to the 
goal state. It would seem that this provides a natural solution to the 
problem. 
However, there is a basic problem in this whole approach that makes 
it difficult to deal with failures in a direct way. If we consider 
WITHIN-GRASP(RO::K) to be the desired goal state of positioning the hand 
to grasp an object, a failure such as bt.nnping into the rock will be 
respon::]ed to by replanning to achieve the goal. It would not be 
difficult for the planning system to determine that this can be done by 
locating the rock, and then positioning the hand. 'Ibis is fine, but 
such a system would be incapable of recognizing that simple 
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repositioning of the hand would be adequate if the failure were the 
result of servoing errors. To state it in more general terms, modelling 
actions merely in terms of preconditions and postconditions is not 
adequate in analyzing what caused the failure and what can be done about 
it. Such analysis in needed to construct practical recovery strategies. 
A number of systems falling within the planning paradigm are 
described, in spite of the fact that the above criticism can be levelled 
against them. 'Ihey are described because they embody some important 
concepts relevant to our discussion. 
The planning approach is exemplified by the SHAKEY system [Raphael 
71, Fikes 71]. Plans produced by STRIPS, the SHAKEY planner, were 
structured into triangle tables. 'Ihe triangle tables gave precise 
meaning to the concept of a kernel -- the set of conditions that were 
relevant to the execution of the plan. Specifically, the important 
property is that the truth of the kernel associated with each action in 
a plan ensured that the subsequent steps would succeed (barring 
operational failures). Furthermore, this concept allowed SHAKEY to be 
clever in replanning from failures by attempting to achieve intermediate 
goal states. 
Nilsson[73] has dealt briefly with the problem of error recovery in 
studying nethods for integrating planning and execution. He identifies 
two kinds of events -- failures and surprises -- that a robot must deal 
with in a dynamic and uncertain world . His notion of failures includes 
execution time failures which we are concerned with, but also 
encompasses failures in planning. Execution time failures were handled 
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by the simple means of repeating the failed action, but the system had 
no good understanding of whether. this would work or not. 
The notion of surprises is a consequence of a dynamic world in 
which other agents play a role in changing the world. Nilsson suggests 
that these probl~ns be tackled by the use of demons set up to watch for 
certain conditions. 'lhe demon would transfer control to a higher level 
executive when its activating conditions were made true. The hope was 
that the higher level executive would be able to deal with the surprise 
since it was the one which set up the demon. 
Surprises are dealt with in an interesting manner by Hayes[75]. 
His system uses a representation of robot plans that make explicit the 
relationship between decisions and subgoals. New information is dealt 
with by discarding portions of the plan which are dependent on the new 
information. Replanning fills in the rest in a manner appropriate to 
the new situation. 
MEND does not specifically deal with the problem of surµrises, and 
will remain oblivious to new information about the world as long as it 
does not cause an immediate failure. It deals with the situatio~ when 
failures occur, but is short-sighted in not checking for future 
failures. 
Sacerdoti describes a system called NOAH [Sacerdoti 75] which uses 
a data structure called a proc~>dural net for planning and execution. 
NOAH does not have a good model of why actions fail and therefore 
resorts to a hierarchical search for an erroneously executed substep 
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when a failure is detected. Having identified the substep which failed, 
NOAH resp:::mds by replanning to achieve the intended effects of this 
action. 
'llle approach that has been adopted in MEND is closest in spirit to 
that taken by Sussman and Goldstein. Sussman's system, HACKER [Sussman 
73], is designed to learn to build structures in the BLOCKS world, and 
Goldstein deals with the problem of debugging incorrect "line drawing" 
programs through a system called MYCROFT [Goldstein 74]. 'Ihe main 
difference is that their systems are addressed to the problem of 
handling conceptual errors. 'lhese conceptual errors arise either as a 
result of a lack of knowledge about the domain or because of an 
erroneous first attempt at planning, where interactions between related 
steps are not considered. In spite of this basic difference, ~1e can 
make a i;x>int of comparison with HACKER. HACKER's analysis of failure 
reasons is based on an explicit representation of the previous states of 
the world in different contexts and an implicit representation of 
previous actions in the control frarries created by calls on the action 
routines. Such mechanisms are quite impractical. In analyzing 
failures, MEND does not have access to the previous states of the world, 
and can only use currently available information and a record of actions 
that have been executed. 
- 14 -
1. 4 AN OVERVIEW OF THE REPORI' 
The following two chapters describe the hardware and software of 
the JPL robot, the structure of MEND, the world model, the 
interpretation of actions, and the detection of failures. Chapter 4 
describes the process of failure reason analysis and how it is used in 
recovery from failures. A number of scenarios illustrate MEND's 
capabilities. Chapter 5 presents a brief outline of multiple outcome 
analysis and discusses the problem of integrating failure reason 
analysis and rnul tiple outcome analysis. The final chapter swrunar izes 
the results, discusses the limitations of MEND, and .suggests ~ssible 
extensions. 
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THE JPL ROBor 
-------
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The problem of error recovery discussed in the previous chapter was 
studied as part of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's research program in 
robotics. In fact the results reported in this thesis are · abstractions 
of the design concepts implemented in a module called MEND which is one 
of the components of the robot software system. Tnis thesis gained 
substance from some of the actual problems encounter~ in the JPL robot 
system, and these problems placed realistic requirements on the program 
designed for error recovery. 
'Ihis chapter gives an overview of the JPL robotics program, 
describing its motivation, hardware, tasks and goals for the robot, the 
components of the system, and their structural relationships. 
2.2 JPL PR(X;RAM OBJECTIVES 
Robots, autonomous or semi-autonomous · machines with human like 
capability, are considered essential for planetary exploration. 
Machines that perform tasks on a step by step basis under human control 
are very inefficient when there is significant time delay in 
conununication between the hwnan control center and the machine. 
Difficulties are further exaggerated because of limitations in channel 
capacity. Because conditions in the territory to be explored are either 
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largely unknown, or at least unpredictable in detail, manipulation and 
locomotion will have to be achieved by execution of a large number of 
highly conservative steps. It is only by such means that environmental 
hazards can be avoided with reasonable chance of success. The above 
considerations motivate the JPL robotics research program. 'Ihe long 
range goals of the project are to demonstrate the usefulness of 
artificial intelligence concepts for integrated robot systems, and 
arrive at guidelines for their design. More specifically, the irrmediate 
goals of the program are to build a breadboard robot system. This will 
be described next. 
2. 3 JPL ROBOT HARO'JARE 
'Ihe hardware of the breadboard robot system is shown in Figure 1.1. 
The manipulator, TV cameras and the laser rangefinder are mounted on a 
four wheeled vehicle. 'Ihe hardware thus provides for three essential 
functional capabilities -- manipulation, vision and locomotion. 
2.3.1 ARM hardware 
'Ihe manipulator is a modified version of the Scheinman arm and is 
described by Dobrotin[73]. Figure 2.1 shows the kinematic configuration 
of the JPL manipulator. It has six degrees of freedom which allow the 
hand to be placed in an arbitrary position and orientation. The hand is 
a parallel jaw mechanism and has touch sensors mounted on the inside of 
the fingers. The positions that can be reached define the vx:>rk space of 
- 17 -
y 
6 JOINT 11_6 
FtGUR£ 2 .1 
the manipulator. A detailed study of the work space of the JPL 
manipulator has been performed by Bejczy[72]. The manipulator can lift 
objects of about five pounds, and fast system response makes it possible 
for most trajectories to be executed within five seconds. 
'Ihe manipulator is driven by permanent magnet torque motors. 
Electro-mechanical brakes hold the manipulator in position without the 
need for driving the motors. Feedback information is made available 
from each joint by means of potentiometers for T?Osition information, and 
tachometers for rate inforrr0tion. 'Ihese are used by the servo loops 
implementing the real time control of the manipulator. Subsequent 
chapters will show the importance of position feedback information for 
purposes of error recovery. 
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Figure 2.2 shows the reference frame which is used for manipulation 
purposes. 'Ibis reference frame will be called the robot coordinate 
system. The actual position of the hand will be referred to as the 
position in robot coordinates. 'Ihe position of the manipulator can be 
computed from the joint angles as measured by the potentiometers. 'Ihe 
equations defining this transformation are given by Lewis (74]. Let us 
call the position computed in this manner, the position in hand 
coordinates. In general the position in robot coordinates will be 
different from the position in hand coordinates because of potentiometer 
errors, digitization errors and conversion errors. This error will be 
called the robot-hand position~' and as we shall see is the cause 
of several kinds of errors. 
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2.3.2 EYE hardware 
The combination of the TV camera and the laser rangefinder system 
will be collectively referred to as the vision system [Williams 76]. 
Both are mounted on a pan and tilt mechanism and provide the primary 
means of sensing the environment. 
'IWo solid state (charge-injection device) TV cameras provide stereo 
image data to the robot. The image array has 244 lines with 188 
elements per line. '!he laser rangefinder is built around a gallit.nn 
arsenide pulsed laser. The resolution in the workspace of the robot is 
about a quarter inch in the horizontal direction and a half inch ~n the 
vertical direction. 
As with the manipulator, there is ·a position error that is to be 
contended with in the vision system. The coordinates of a point as 
determined by the vision system will be called the position in eye 
coordinates. These are the coordinates that will be used for 
positioning the manipulator in a desired location. 'Ihe robot-eye 
position error can cause certain failures in manipulation, and these 
will be discussed in later chapters. 
2.3.3 VEHICLE hardware 
The vehicle provides for the mobility of the robot. The four 
wheels are independently driven by rx: torque motors. The front and rear 
wheels can be steered independently by an Ackerman type double steering. 
'rhe load capacity of the vehicle is about 500 pounds and travel speed is 
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limited to about l mile/hour. Position feedback is available through 
odometers. Tachometers provid~ velocity information and a directional 
gyro compass provides directional reference. 
Tne vehicle has only recently been integrated into the system. It 
has not been considered in detail in the investigation reported here. 
2.4 TASKS AND GOAI.S 
An extensive study has been performed delineating science 
requirements for a Mars roving mission [Choate 72]. The science 
requirements of such a mission provide goals for an investigation such 
as the one undertaken in the JPL robotics research program. The 
breadboard system, however, is limited to a much narrower set of 
immediately realizable goals. 
Consider sample collection. Tne problem of deciding what rocks are 
of scientific interest is beyond the capabilities of the system, and is 
likely to remain so for some time to come. 'Ihese decisions are ~o be 
made by a team of science experts, who will monitor the activities of 
the robot and make selections of samples to be collected and decide what 
experiments are to be conducted, etc. To give a feeling for the 
interactions involved in such a semiautonomous system we describe a 
hypothetical scenario. 
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Supp.Jse that the robot is cormnanded to pick up a specified rock and 
to put it on a viewing table • . To achieve this the robot will have to 
use the vision system to build a three dimensional model of its 
environment and in particular to determine the location of the rock. 
Deciding on a grasping orientation, the robot will then compute a 
trajectory for moving the hand into a l,?OSition appropriate for grasping 
the object. After picking it up, it will then compute a second 
trajectory to place the rock on the viewing table. We can imagine that 
the viewing table makes it convenient for examining the rock more 
closely, in order to make a decision whether or not it is worth keeping. 
Such decisions are likely to be time consuming and in the meantime the 
robot can be commanded to do other tasks. Perhaps a rock can be removed 
from an experiment chamber and transp.Jrted to a sample container. Once 
the decision has been made about the rock on the viewing table, the 
robot can then be corrnnanded, for instance, to discard the rock. 
We note that some interactions are essential for scientific 
reasons. However, we expect the robot to make many operational 
decisions about when to use vision, or how to grasp a rock, on its own. 
It is in this connection that error recovery becorres important since we 
would like to minimize operational interactions. 'lbe reasons for this 
have been discussed in detail in several studies[Hooke 74, Whitney 74], 
and from a pragmatic p.Jint of view, these reasons provide a major 
motivation for systems with automated error recovery. 
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2.5 SYSTEM CCMPONENTS AND STROCTURAL ORGANIZATION 
From a software point of view, one of the major problems in 
building a robot is the integration of manipulation, locomotion and 
vision. The JPL robot system embodies one approach towards this 
problem. 'Ihe rationale and design considerations have been described in 
detail by Weinstein[75a, 75b]. 
PDP\O 
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'Ihe functional capabilities of the robot hardware are incorporated 
within three software modules for manipulation, locomotion and vision. 
'Ihese modules are called ARM, ROVER and EYE respectively, and are 
collectively referred to as operative m<Xlules. The operative modules 
are controlled by the OPerative executive ( OPX ) , which in turn 
receives commands from the Robot Executive ( REX ) • 'lbese five modules 
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are sepa.rate concurrent processes, hierarchically structured as shown in 
the Figure 2.3 [Srinivas 73a, 7~b, Stevens 74, Roth 75]. 
Figure 2.3 shows the actual division of the modules between two 
different computer installations. The software on the PDP 10 is largely 
written in SAIL [Vanlehn 73] , while the software for the SPC 16 at JPL 
is written in FORTRAN. Each of the modules on the PDP 10 is implemented 
as a separate job. Communication between jobs is achieved through a 
message passing mechanism called MAILER. 
RD130\ 
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Note the division of the operative modules into two components. 
The details of Figure 2.3 will be largely ignored in the subsequent 
sections of this report, and the more abstract structure of Figure 2.4 
will be used. The components of this figure will be described in 
functional terms in the following subsections. 
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2.5.1 Robot Executive System l REX l 
REX serves as the interface between the human supervisor and the 
rest of the robot software. Such an interface is necessary because the 
robot is not a completely autonomous system, and ultimate control 
resides in the human supervisor. The supervisor is thus provided with a 
set of commands to control and monitor the activities of the in~egrated 
system. One of the design requirements is that REX be almost 
irrunediately responsive to the human supervisor. It is for this among 
other reasons that REX is a separate process running concurrently with 
the rest of the robot software. 
Through REX the human supervisor can interact with the robot in the 
following ways. He can: 
(1) Create, edit and delete plans. A plan editor is incorporated as 
part of REX. 
(2) Request execution of plans and abort plan execution. 
(3) I:etermine the status of the system to many levels of detail. 
(4) Trace the flow of control and data between the different modules. 
2.5.2 The Operative.Executive J. OPX .L 
The operative modules are individually responsible for the specific 
functional capabilities of the robot. To achieve a collective effort 
these modules are integrated by means of OPX. OPX achieves this by 
invoking primitive actions 
order specified in a plan. 
execution of plans. 
implemented in the operative modules in an 
Tnus the primary function of OPX is the 
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Plans are structured sets of action units or other plans. 
language allows for concurren~ execution of action units 
different operative modules through a CCBEGIN-COEND feature. 
The plan 
in the 
However, 
we will restrict plans to sequential list of actions in this study. 
Each action unit specifies the operative module to be invoked and the 
specific action routine to be called. OPX sends to the appropriate 
operative module a message requesting the execution of a primitive 
action. en completion of the action, OPX continues with plan execution 
by repeating the above process with the next action unit. When the plan 
has been successfully executed a completion message is sent up to REX. 
During execution of the plan OPX is still responsive to rressages 
from REX. OPX can therefore determine the status of the operative 
module, abort the plan, or turn on tracing, so that the flow of control 
becomes explicit to the user. 
2. 5. 3 The Operative Modules (ARM, EYE, and ROVER) 
action capabilities of 
the 
The operative modules implement primitive 
robot. 'llle implementation is termed an action unit, and a 
primitives on which more collection of such action units defines the 
complex plans are based. 
The implementation of these primitive actions is a difficult task 
in itself. As example we consider some action units in each of the 
operative modules. 
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(1) ARM MO VETO 
The MOVE'I'O action unit takes the manipulator from its current 
location to the specified goal position. In doing so it has to 
find a trajectory such that collisions are avoided. 'lbe 
manipulation system implemented by I.ewis[74] includes a simple 
collision detector, but the system is likely to show markedly 
improved capability with the integration of the software developed 
by Udupa[76]. Udupa's solution is based on a theoretical framework 
which makes the task of collision detection and avoidance 
computationally tractable. 
Once the trajectory has been determined, the joint angles need 
to be determined as a function of time, so that the manipulator 
will trace the desired trajectory.. 'Ibis again is a fairly complex 
task involving both kinematics and dynamics of the manipulator. 
I.ewis[76] has implemented a very elegant solution to this problem. 
(2) EYE : LOCATE 
To U::X:ATE an object, the vision system needs to segment the 
digitized TV picture. Once the picture has been segmented the 
scene is analyzed, and a three dimensional model of the scene is 
built up using a combination of laser and stereoscopic information. 
Both segmentation and building 3-D models are difficult tasks 
involving considerable computational power. Williams[76], who has 
presented an overview of the JPL robot vision system, discusses 
these and other problems. 
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(3) Rover : GOro 
For the robot to be mobile, . a path planning algorithm [Udupa 74, 
Thompson 75] is necessary. Given a description of the environment, 
the -path planning algorittun finds a safe route to the goal 
location. The GOro action unit then takes the vehicle along the 
planned route. 'Ihe real time control of the vehicle is an 
extremely difficult problem especially in uneven and hazardous 
terrains. A first version['Ihompson 76] of such a real time 
controller and a path planner is now capable of moving the vehicle 
around in a relatively flat environment in which rocks of various 
sizes are strewn around. 
2.6 EXAMPLE OF EXECCJrION 
Consider a simple plan called PICKUP with the following structure: 
(rock) 
BEGIN 
LCX:ATE (rock); 
MOVE-HAND-'1'0-GRASP (rock); 
GRASP (rock) 
END 
(We will use the convention that identifiers in lower case letters are 
uninstantiated parameters.} The human supervisor starts things rolling 
by corrunanding REX to execute the plan PICKUP with the parameter RCCKl. 
The plan is instantiated (with ROCKl for "rock") and then sent to OPX 
for execution. 
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OPX begins execution by invoking vision to UX:ATE RCA':Kl. This 
results in a TV picture being taken. 1l1e picture is digitized and then 
segmented. ROCI<l i.s identified in the segmented image and the vision 
system then builds a three-dimensional model of the rock. A descriptor 
of ROCKl is returned which contains information about its location, 
width, height, support level, etc. 
On receiving a completion message from the EYE operative module, 
OPX sends the next action unit to the ARM module. With the newly 
updated data for ROCKl, the ARM module determines an orientation for 
positioning the hand around the object. Trajectory computation is 
performed and the ARM executes the trajectory. A COllll?letion message is 
then sent to OPX. OPX continues execution by sending the GRASP action 
unit to the ARM module. 'Ihe ARM module· executes GRASP. The completion 
message from this action unit signals plan completion. OPX sends a 
message to REX with this information. 
2.7 ERRORS AND A MODULE FOR ERROR RECOVERY 
--- -- - --- -- --·· ----
The execution of the plan PICKUP(ROCKl) described in the previous 
section assumes that every action succeeded in achieving its goal. 
Consider a case in which the hand bumps onto the object, instead of 
being correctly positioned around it. On detecting such an error, the 
ARM module sends an error message to OPX. OPX terminates plan execution 
by aborting the plan. An error message is sent up to REX, and the human 
supervisor is given the responsibility of planning recovery. 
OPE.R.Al I LJ r= 
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The goal of this thesis is to automate recovery from such failures. 
For this puq:ose a module called MEND has been implemented and its olace 
in the robot structure is shown in Figure 2.5. The following chapters 
will describe MEND's capabilities and its internal structure. To 
illustrate the techniques used by MEND in planning recovery from 
failures, several scenarios dealing wi th the Hand-Eye subsystem of the 
JPL robot will be described. 
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A DESCRIPrION OF M&l\JD 
3.1 INTRODUC'rION 
In the previous chapter the need for a recovery system like MEND 
was explained. The relationship of MEND with other modules of the JPL 
robot system was briefly described. In this chapter we take a look at 
its internal structure. This chapter also describes the representation 
of knowledge about actions, the world model, the interpretation and 
execution of actions, updates to the world model and other details of 
MEND. 
In its initial conception, MEND was expected to come into play only 
when a failure was detected. We can depict such a relationship as shown 
in Figure 3.1. 
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Tasks or goals are specified to the robot executive system which 
translates these into actual changes in the real \'K>rld. If a failure is 
detected during execution of the task, then MEND receives an error 
message describing the failure. MEND responds to this by analyzing the 
failure and suggesting appropriate corrective steps. These corrective 
steps are structured into a recovery plan which is then sent over to the 
executive system. 
Tne first version of MEND that was implemented reflected this 
initial idea. Its limitations provided a major motivation of the system 
as it exists now. Among other things it became clear that there was a 
need for a much more intimate relationship between the execution of 
plans and the analysis of failures. 'Ihe second version of MEND plays a 
much more important role in the system. The description in this report 
is a conceptualization of this second version. 
3. 2 THE INTERNAL STROCTURE OF MEND 
-- -- ---- ----- -- ---
MEND consists of many parts which interact together to execute 
plans, recover from failures etc. Every computation in MEND has access 
to three entities and these are shown in Figure 3. 2. Knowledge about 
actions is built into the system and is not modified by any computation. 
'Ihe world model represents the current state of the \'K>rld and the robot. 
The execution of actions results in utx'lates to the \'K>rld model to 
reflect the changes in the real \'K>rld. Tne execution trace represents 
information about the plan currently in execution, such as what action 
IVOfU .... D 
fv\O DE..L 
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is to be executed next, what previous action failed, what corrective 
actions were taken, etc. 'Ihese entities are discussed in more detail in 
later sections. 
3.2.1 Execution of plans with MEND 
At first we ignore the problem of error recovery and merely 
consider the execution of plans. Figure 3.3 indicates the flow of 
control between the different computations in MEND, and the tVK> major 
states that MEND can be in when quiescent. 
Some notational conventions are first described. Circles represent 
states and rectangles represent computational processes. Transitions 
from a state are activated when a message is received. Messages 
received by MEND are enclosed in square brackets with the sender being 
identified as a prefix to the message. A process can have several 
outcomes and can lead to other states or processes. Typically when a 
process leads to a state, a message is sent to another module (OPX). 
- 33 -
PLAIJ- (IJl TIA-TOR. 
f\C{IQN- I/JI TIA-TOR. 
These messages are enclosed in circular brackets, the receiver being 
identified as a pref ix to the message. 
With these conventions in mind, we can easily interpret Figure 3.3 
in the following manner : If MEND receives a message indicating that 
plan execution is to be initiated, it readies itself for plan execution. 
PI.AN-INITIATOR builds a structure representing the plan to be executed 
and initializes the status by pointing to the first action in the plan. 
It then transfers control to ACTION-INITIATOR. ACTION-INITIATOR checks 
preconditions to verify that the action can in fact be executed. Then 
the action is interpreted by ACTION-INTERPRETER in terms of simpler 
action primitives which are directly executable by the operative system. 
A message requesting execution of the primitive is sent to OPX and MEND 
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goes into the EXECUTE state. When MEND receives a completion message, 
ACTION-COMPLETOR checks that the results are as expected, updates the 
world model, updates the plan status and then transfers control to 
AC'rION-INITIATOR if there are more actions to be executed. Typically a 
cycle of ACTION-INITIATOR's and ACTION-CCMPLE'I'OR's will sequence through 
the plan until execution of the plan is completed. When this occurs, 
PIAN-Ca1PLETOR cleans up the execution tr ace and returns MEND to the 
IDLE state. 
3.2.2 MEND with error recovery 
Mo A 
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FIGURE 3.4-
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MEND, as represented in Figure 3.3, monitors the execution of plans 
by checking preconditions before executing actions and by checking 
postconditions to ensure that actions have been performed correctly. 
'Ihe figure does not indicate what MEND does when these checks fail or if 
an error message is generated by an operative module as a result of 
executing an action. Figure 3.4 answers this issue. 
We can immediately note from Figure 3.4 that there are two ways in 
which failures are detected and control can be transferred to FRA, the 
failure reason analyzer. 'l'he path from the state EXECUTE to FRA 
represents those situations where failure is detected by the primitive 
actions. It is not always possible to rely on the primitives to detect 
the failure since failure is meaningful only in the context of the 
specific way in which the primitive is being 'used. These failures are 
detected by ACTION-COMPLE'IDR which has knowledge about the 
post-conditions of the actions interpreted by MEND. 
'Ihe checking of preconditions, which is done as part of the 
ACTION-INITIA'IDR, is a way of anticipating and avoiding failures during 
execution. If the preconditions are found to be false, the PLAN-PATCHER 
is called to achieve these preconditions. If they have been only 
partially verified then these are marked as being UNVERIFIED in the 
execution trace, and execution is allowed to continue. (This will be 
explained in greater detail.) 
FRA, DECIDER, flU and PLAN-PA'D:HER perform 
responsible for handling recovery from failures. 
failure and finds one or more ex?lanations for the 
the computations 
FRA analyzes the 
failure. DECIDER 
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provides a means of integrating failure reason analysis with multiple 
outcome analysis. In cases where the failure reason analysis has 
provided a simple solution for planning recovery, DECIDER transfers 
control to the PIAN-PA'D:HER. Otherwise, MOA is called. In analyzing 
multiple outcomes MCli\ may find that the available information is 
inadequate. In such circumstances MEND resorts to model-driven 
information gathering by asking for execution of simple actions, and 
going into an ACQUIRE state. On completion of the information gathering 
step, multiple outcome analysis is continued. When analysis is complete 
the PIAN-PA'.ICHER is called with the results ot the analysis. 
PLAN-PATCHER uses the results of the analysis to find a set of 
corrective steps and patch the plan in execution. 
3. 3 WORLD MODEL 
'Ihe state of the world is represented in MEND through a set of data 
structures that will be collectively referred to as the 'M'.)rld model. 
Typically, other systems model the world in terms of assertions 
represented as lists of items. MEND's representation is much more 
structured and tailored around the entities that it needs to deal with. 
The advantage of this is ease of accessing and efficiency of 
implementation, with the associated disadvantage of non-uniform 
procedures for accessing and updating the data base. Accessing of the 
world model occurs in several ways. ACTION-INTERPRETER needs to use 
information about the location and orientation of objects in 
interpreting actions in terms of simpler pr imi ti ves. An 
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INTERPRET-ROurINE associated with actions is programmed to access the 
world model to determine such information. In other words, knowledge 
about the way in which data are represented in the world model is built 
into these procedures. 
Another set of procedures that access the world model are the 
INITIATE-ROurINE's. These routines check preconditions and constraints 
applicable to the action with which they are associated. In MEND 
checking of preconditions and constraints is somewhat different from 
traditional robot problem solving systems. We illustrate with an 
example. C.onsider the precondition WITHIN-GRASP (ROCK) for GRASP (ROCK). 
'Ihe INI'rIATE-ROurINE for GRASP will check that the hand position is 
within a small tolerance limit of the known location of the ROCK. If 
this check fails, then the precondition will be considered to be false. 
However if this condition is found to be true, MEND recognizes that this 
precondition may still not be true because of J;>OSsible inaccurate 
information about the location of the ROCK. If in addition, though, 
MEND finds that the touch sensors in the hand are activated, then it 
will consider WITHIN-GRASP to be true. The main J;>Oint to be noted is 
that precondition . testing is not equivalent to looking for an 
appropriate assertion in the world model, or to deducing this from other 
assertions. 
A third set of procedures, the FINISH-UP-ROurINES associated with 
each action, update the world model and check completion conditions. 
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There are four entities about which information needs to be 
represented, and they are the state of the hand, objects, stations and 
frames. We discuss each of these in turn. 
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'!he hand state descriptor is updated after execution of any ARM 
action. The values of all the joint angles of the manipulator are 
recorded as attributes of the hand descriptor. From these joint angles 
it is possible to. calculate the position of the hand, the sliding 
vector, and the approach vector in the Cartesian robot coordinate system 
[Figures 2.2, 3.5], but these are redundantly represented in the hand 
state descriptor. (The sliding vector refers to the vector along which 
the fingers move when the hand is opened or closed. '!he approach vector 
points in the direction of the fingers. Both these are indicated in 
Figure 3.5.) The hand state descriptor also includes information about 
the state of the touch sensors, and a]:x)ut the finger separation. 
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In addition to the above data, additional information is stored as 
part of the hand state descriptor. An attribute called GRASP-STATE 
indicates whether the hand is holding an object, touching an object, or 
whether the hand is empty. Another attribute, the GRASP-HEIGHT records 
the z coordinate of the hand whenever an object is grasped. This piece 
of information is useful in determining how far above the station the 
hand should be when attempting to place the grasped object at a desired 
location. 
3.3.2 Object descriptor~ 
Each object is represented as an item in the data base, and is 
described by various attributes. 'Ihe vision system estimates the 
location of the object from a stereo view of the scene with additional 
information from the laser system in some cases. It also estimates an 
orientation of the object (the axis of the longest dimension), the 
grasping direction, the width along the grasp direction, and the height 
of the object, the support level, and other such details. All these are 
represented as part of the description of the object. In addition to 
these an attribute called ABSTRACT-LOCATION indicates whether the object 
is at a station, in the robot's hand, or whether the fingers are merely 
touching the object. 'lhis information is useful in testing 
pre-conditions and also in interpreting the attributes of an object in a 
meaningful manner. For instance, if the object has been gras~d, then 
the location of the object is determined from the hand position and not 
from its LOCATION attribute. A point to note about the representation 
in MEND is that there is redundancy in the the world model. If the 
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ABSTRACT-u::x:ATION indicated that the object is in the robot's hand, the 
GRASP-ST.~TE of the hand will alse indicate that the robot is holding the 
object. This redundant description makes it convenient to get the 
necessary information directly rather than by an associative or pattern 
directed search. 
3.3.3 Station descriptors 
Stations provide a means of naming some designated locations. 
These locations can either be on the ground or on the robot platform. 
Station O::::CUPAN:Y indicates whether or not there is an object at the 
station. This will be checked, for instance, before an object is 
transported to the station to be placed there. A 
STATION-TOLERANCE-LIMIT can be specified and later used in determining 
whether a placement of the object at the station is within acceptable 
limits. 
3.3.4 Frame descriptor 
A frame defines the position, s liding vector and approach vector of 
the hand, and is useful in specifying intermediate configurations when 
t he hand moves from one location to another . With a good obstacle 
avoider built into the manipulation system it should be possible to 
eliminate this low level of dealing with hand configurations. 
they are necessary in the current system to avoid obstacles. 
However, 
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3. 4 KNOOLEDGE ABOUT ACTIONS 
The implementation of ARM, EYE, and VEHICLE provide higher levels 
of the robot system with action primitives. These primitives can be 
used to achieve various results. For instance, the primitive MOVETO 
which can move the hand from one position to another, can be used to 
position the hand around the object or to transport the object from one 
position to another. In the first case, it would be reasonable to check 
that the hand is empty before begining execution of the action, while in 
the latter case it is necessary to verify that the object to be 
transported is in the hand. Modelling of actions directly in terms of 
these primitives is difficult because of the different conditions that 
apply in different circumstances. 
MEND thus models a slightly higher level set of actions which are 
specialized for different functions. MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP(object), for 
example, is· a specialization of MOVETO with the implicit pur!;X)se of 
positioning the hand around the object to be grasped. When the human 
specifies a task by writing a plan composed of these higher level 
actions there is an implicit notion of its intended effects. It is this 
notion of purpose or intent that makes it lX)ssible to recover from 
failures in actions in a reasonable manner. 
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Each action is represented in MEND as an item in the data base, and 
has both a declarative and procedural component[Figure 3.6]. Tne 
declarative model is represented as triples in an associative data 
base[LEAP data structures in SAIL - Vanlehn 73], and a triple (A IV) is 
interpreted to mean that attribute A of item I has value V. A partial 
description of the declarative model of MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP is shown 
below: 
(ACTION-TYPE MOVE-HAND-To-GRASP(ROCK) EFFF.cTOR) 
(PRE.cONDITION MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP (ROCK) (EJl1Pl'Y-HAND)) 
(PRECONDITION MOVE-HAND-TO-GR~SP(ROCK) (OPEN-HAND)) 
(NEEDED MOVE-HAND-'l'O-GRASP (ROCK) LO:ATION (ROCK)) 
(RESULT MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP (ROCK) WITHIN-GRASP (ROCK)) 
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This model represents the fact the MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP is an 
effector action, that it has a par~neter called RO:K, that one of its 
pre-conditions is EMPI'Y-HAND, that the location of the Ro:K is needed 
information, that its intended result is WITHIN-GRASP(RO:K), and so on. 
'lhe procedural component consists of an INITIATE-ROITTINE, an 
INTERPRET-ROurINE, FINISH-{JP-ROurINE, a FRA-ROurINE, and a MOl\-ROurINE 
associated with the action [Figure 3. 6]. ACTION-INITIATOR for 
instance, calls the MOVE-HAND...JI'O-GRASP INITIATE-ROITTINE to check 
parameter types and preconditions. 
Let us now take a brief look at the actions that have been modelled 
for demonstrating error recovery in simple manipulation tasks. 
3.4.1 ARM actions 
(1) MOVETO(frame) 
This action defines the most primitive caµability of the 
manipulator to move from one location to another. 'I'he parameter of 
MOVETO specifies the desired absolute position and orientation of 
the manipulator. This action is not directly modelled in MEND but 
the following specializations of this action are. 
(la) MOVE-HAND...JI'O-GRASP (object) 
The expected result of this action is to position the hand such 
that the fingers surround the specified object. The initiation 
routine will check that the hand is empty, that the fingers are 
open, and that the object is graspable. The INTERPRET-ROUrINE 
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determines a position and orientation which is appropriate for 
grasping the object. In general this could be a difficult problem 
requiring a good understanding of the shapes of objects and the 
resulting constraints on how the object can be grasped. However, 
for the simplified world that MEND is being tested in, this is 
relatively straightforward. In fact, a grasp orientation is 
suggested by the vision system. 
(lb) MOVE-HAND-TO (frame) 
The only difference between this action and the primitive MOVETO is 
that the INITIATE-ROUrINE will check that there is nothing in the 
hand. 
(le) APPROACH (object) 
Sometimes it is necessary to position the hand near the object so 
that the location of the object can be determined relative to the 
hand. This action positions the hand at a point some small 
distance above the object. 1he INITIATE-ROurINE will check that 
the hand is not holding any object. 
(ld) TRANSPORT (object, station) 
An object which has been grasped can be transported to a station 
where it is to be placed. Preconditions that are checked ensure 
that the object is the hand, and that the station is unoccupied. 
The INTERPRET-ROurINE will use the information recorded in the 
GRASP-HEIGHT attribute of the hand state descriptor in computing a 
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hand position which will result in the object gently bumping onto 
the desired station. The FINISH-UP-ROUrINE will check that the 
station tolerance limit is not exceeded. 
(le) MOVE-OBJECT...!JD (object, frame) 
This is similar to MOVE-HAND-'"l'O except that in this case an object 
is expected to be in the hand. 
(2) SEPARATE(finger!separation) 
This action results in the fingers being opened (or closed) to the 
desired finger 
s pee ial i za tions • 
(2a) GRASP(object) 
separation. This action again has several 
Execution of this action results in the object being grasped 
provided that the fingers have been positioned around the object. 
'lhe motors driving the fingers are kept active for a short period 
of time even after the object has been sensed by means of the touch 
sensors. 'lhis is done so that the hand gets a firm grip on the 
object. The INITIATE-ROUTINE will check that the position of the 
hand and the known position of the location of the object indicate 
that the object is WITHIN-GRASP. However, this test does not 
guarantee that the object is really within grasp because of 
possible errors in the location of the object. The 
FINISH-UP-ROUTINE will update the ABSTRACT-LOCATION of the object 
to indicate that the object is in the robot's hand. The 
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GRASP-STATE and GRASP=-HEIGHT attributes of the hand descriptor are 
also updated. 
(2b) CLCSE!UNTIL!TOUCH(object) 
'Ihis is similar to GRASP. However the fingers stop moving the 
moment the touch sensors are activated. Often it is a good 
heuristic to gently close the fingers around the object and then 
squeeze tight in order to GRASP the object. After execution 
ABSTRACT-LOCATION will merely indicate that the hand is touching 
the object. 
(2c) LE']X;Q(object, station) 
This merely SEPARATES the fingers to release the object. It 
verifies that there is an object in hand and that hand is at the 
station. 'Ihe FINISH-UP-ROurINE will change station OCCUPANCY to 
occupied, updates the ABSTRACT-I.CX::ATION of the object to indicate 
that it is AT(station). 
3.4.2 EYE action units 
(1) UX:ATE (object) 
This action assumes that the object has been identified either by 
specifying an approximate location, or by certain distinguishing 
features of the object. A new descriptor is created by the 
FINISH-UP-ROurINE and the different attributes updated with the 
information provided by the execution of this action. 
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( 2) LCCATE-REIATIVE-TO-HAND (object) 
On occasion it is necessary to determine the position of an object 
accurately. Part of the difficulty in determining the location 
accurately is the discrepancies between the hand coordinate system 
and the eye coordinate system. To avoid this problem the hand is 
brought close t.o the object, and the location of the object 
determined relative to the hand. As with locate, 
UX::ATE-RELATIVE...JI'O-HAND updates data structures describing the 
object. 
3. 5 THE EXECUI'ION TRACE 
A new execution trace is created by PLAN-INITIATOR whenever a new 
plan is to be executed. It starts off as a set of ncrles strung together 
to represent the plan to be executed. Each node is associated with an 
action and its parameters. A NEXT-TO-BE-EXECUTED pointer indicates 
which action is to be executed next. An example of an initial structure 
is shown in Figure 3.7. 
Several things get added to the trace as execution proceeds. 
Before beginning execution of an action, the INITIATE-ROUI'INE will mark 
all unverified preconditions and constraints by creating triples of the 
form: 
(UNVERIFIED NODE~ WITHIN-GRASP (ROCK) ) 
(UNVERIFIED NJDE~ GRASPABLE (ROCK)) 
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After successful execution, the NEXT-TO-BE-EXOCUTED p::>inter is 
moved ahead to the next node. If failure occurs and PLAN-PATCHER 
successfully finds a recovery plan, it will modify the execution trace 
by creating new nodes for the action to be executed. 
for failure in ~DE-B of Figure 3.7, corrected by a 
'Ihe new structure is shown in Figure 3.8. 
We show an example 
single step plan. 
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After execution of the recovery plan, execution will continue with 
the node following the failed action. 
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FAILURE REASON Al\lALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
MEND uses two different strategies for recovery from failures. In 
this chapter we discuss how ME'ND analyzes failure and how the results of 
this analysis are used in planning recovery. Let us first take a look 
at a classification of failure reasons. 
4.2 A CIASSIFICATION OF FAILURE REASONS 
MEND's analysis of failures reflects an understanding of four kinds 
of failures. These are operational errors, information errors, 
precondition errors, and constraint errors. We discuss each of these in 
turn. 
Actions can fail to achieve their intended result because of 
certain inherent problems in executing the action. These errors are 
peculiar to the specific operation being performed and are therefore 
referred to as operational errors. We can see a number of examples of 
these kinds of errors in the JPL robot. For instance, the manipulator 
may deviate from the planned trajectory in moving from one location to 
another. 'Ibis operational error of servoing will not often have any 
serious consequences, but in some cases it can cause the manipulator to 
bump into the object to be grasped. 
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The process of determining the location of objects is subject to 
several operational errors. Calibration, resolution limits, noisy data 
and other such reasons are all contributing factors in producing 
erroneous information. For our purposes there is no need to distinguish 
between them, and we will deal with them collectively as a single 
operational error. There is the possibility of confusion here, and we 
reiterate that the operational error does not refer to the inaccuracy in 
the location. This inaccuracy is a consequence of the operational 
error. 
If the robot fails in positioning the hand correctly around the 
object because of inaccuracy in the location of the object, MEND will 
recognize this to be the result of an information error. We see that 
the operational error in locating an object has shown up as an 
information error when attempting to pick up the object. 
Before executing an action the initiate routine will check 
preconditions and constraints. If .any of these are found to be false 
the PI.AN-PA'ICHER will attempt to make them true before continuing with 
the execution of the action. If all the preconditions of actions could 
be checked and verified, there would be no reason for failu~es to occur 
because of precondition errors. However, it would be unrealistic to 
expect a robot to check these preconditions exhaustively, since some of 
them are inherently difficult to check. Therefore, the execution 
monitoring in MEND does not require that all preconditions be absolutely 
verified before executing an action. In some cases executing subsequent 
steps may be the simplest way of finding out that they were or were not 
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satisfied. For instance, checking to see that an object is truly within 
grasp before actually grasping the object is unnecessary and exi;:.ensive, 
since the very action of grasping will immediately indicate whether this 
is true or not. Even when previous actions were executed with the 
intentions of making these preconditions true, the robot cannot always 
dei;:.end on their being true since these previous actions may themselves 
fail for the various reasons under discussion. In any case, the 
consequence of not verifying preconditions is that after execution of an 
action, failure can be attributed to the falsity of preconditions. It 
is with this interpretation in mind that we talk of precondition errors. 
(Similar comments apply to constraint errors discussed later.) 
From the discussion so far it may seem that information and 
precondition errors can both be traced back to operational errors. This 
is largely true but with a small qualification. We cannot ex-p2ct a 
robot to keep a record of its activities (the execution trace) that is 
infinitely long. 'lherefore it is not always possible to trace back the 
reason for failure to an operational error. Also, the plan may have 
been produced with certain conditions being assumed to be true of the 
initial state of the world. In both these circumstances MEND recognizes 
some si;:.ecial cases : initial information error and initial condition 
error. 
Finally, an action can fail because there are some constraints that 
must be satisfied for successful execution. An example of this is that 
the object should be MOVABLE before the robot can transport it from one 
place to another. In a sense, these are merely special cases of 
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preconditions with the limitation that the robot has no way of making 
them true. Of course, what is a "constraint" for one robot may be 
merely a "precondition" for a robot with a larger set of capabilities. 
But lacking omnipotence any robot will have certain limitations and thus 
encounter situations that it can do very 1 i ttle about. Constraints, 
therefore, model certain limitations in the capability of the robot. 
4.3 THE FAILURE TREE 
-- ·-----
The results of failure reason analysis are represented in a 
structure called the failure tree. We first describe this structure, 
before looking at how it is built. 
A 
Fl Gu RE 4 · \ 
Figure 4.1 is an example of a failure tree. 'Ihere are two types of 
nodes in a failure tree -- failure nodes and action nodes. Failure 
nodes are represented by circles and action nodes by rectangles. Action 
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nodes are linked to a node in the execution trace through a plan link 
which is not explicitly shown in the above figure. Each failure node 
identifies the failure and its type, and may point up to one or more 
actions nodes through one of several kinds of links. 'Ihe NAB (Never 
Achieved By) and IPB (Incorrectly Provided By) are tw::> examples of such 
links. Action nodes point up to failure nodes through a PRFF, the 
"possible reason for failure" link. 
'Il1e example in Figure 4.1 can now be interpreted in the following 
manner Goal G was never achieved by action A because of one (or more) 
of two possible reasons Fl and F2. Fl indicates that the failure could 
have been the result of an operational error, while F2 represents data 
incorrectly provided by action B. 
The types of failure that are associated with failure nodes are the 
ones we have discussed earlier (operational, information, precondition, 
and constraint errors) with one addition. 'Ihere is a special "failure 
type" which occurs only at the root of the tree and this represents a 
goal failure {GOAL-FAILURE). Of)erational and constraint failure nodes 
do not point up to anything since they are local to the failed action. 
Precondition nodes may link upward to action nodes that were intended to 
achieve the precondition. When such links are missing it means that no 
action was executed to achieve this condition. It therefore represents 
an initial condition error. Similarly, information failure nodes link 
upward to actions that provides the needed information, and missing 
links indicate initial information errors. 
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4.4 BUILDING A FAILURE TREE 
The idea behind failure reason analysis is to find an explanation 
~ 
of the failure. By explanation we will mean a chain of reasons 
represented by a path from the root node of the failure tree to one of 
its leaf nodes (G - A - F2 - B - F3 in Figure 4.1). If we consider all 
possible reasons for failure at each action node, then the failure tree 
represents all possible explanations for the failure. Clearly, only one 
or a few will be relevant in any particular situation. We can now think 
of failure reason analysis as the process of limiting this set of all 
possible explanations. Of course, it will not always be possible to 
find a single explanation and MEND has to deal with several possible 
explanations in certain cases. 
We next ask what can be done to constrain the set of explanations. 
Several things suggest themselves. Any unsatisfied precondition or 
constraint can be the cause of the failure. However if we know that the 
preconditions and/or constraints have been satisfied then the failure 
cannot be attributed to these causes. 'Ihe execution trace in which 
unverified preconditions and constraints are noted down provide the 
information necessary for this purpose. We reiterate here that a 
precondition is not considered to be verified because a previous action 
was executed to achieve this, but rather is considered to be true when 
independent tests verify the truth of the precondition. To consider a 
trivial example, OPEN-HAND is verified by checking that the finger 
separation is equal to the maximum separation. Typically other robot 
systems verify preconditions by looking for explicit assertions in the 
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data base or by "deducing" the truth of these conditions from other 
assertions. The result of this is no distinction can be made between 
those preconditions that can be verified directly from feedback 
information and those that are only surmised to be true because a 
previous action was supposed to achieve this goal. 
A second important way in which the failure nodes branching from an 
action can be cut down is by looking at the manifestation of the 
failure. Different reasons for failure manifest themselves in different 
ways, and by identifying distinctive features of the failure situation 
sane of the reasons for failure can be shown to be impossible or at 
least unlikely. 
c 
' \ 
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'Ihirdly, the history of actions can show that certain explanations 
are impossible. Consider, for instance the situation in Figure 4.2. 
Suppose that no reasons for failure of action C can be found. In that 
case we can conclude that B could not have failed because of F2. If 
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there are no other reasons for failure of B besides F2, we can further 
conclude that A. could not have failed because of Fl. Such reasoning can 
· significantly cut down the set of possible explanations, thereby 
pointing out the real explanation of the failure. 
In building a failure tree (i.e. in analyzing failures), MEND 
applies constraints at each action node, builds a tree, and finally 
cleans up the tree by eliminating the explanations that can be shown to 
be impossible on the basis of the history of actions. 'Ihe following is 
an overview of the tree building algorithm: 
1. Find the set of possible failure reasons. 
2. Eliminate verified preconditions and constraint failure from this set 
by looking at the execution trace. 
3. look for distinctive features of the manifestation to further 
constrain the set of failure reasons. 
4. For each of the remaining failure reasons create failure nodes and 
link the action node to these newly created failure nodes. 
5. For precondition failure nodes find from the execution trace the 
previous action responsible for making the precondition true. For 
information failure nodes find the previous action which provides the 
necessary information. Create an action node for each of the 
previous actions so determined. 
6. Repeat the above process for the newly generated action nodes. 
7. Clean up the failure tree by eliminating impossible explanations 
(i.e. apply the process described in connection with Figure 4.2). 
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4. 5 THE FAILURE REASON r-DDEL 
We can now see that to execute the algorithm outlined in the 
previous section we need a model of actions that will provide the 
necessary information. 'Ihis is precisely what the failure reason model 
is all about. 
Firstly, the model should identify the set of p::>ssible failures. 
Operational failures are represented explicitly through a set of 
associations as shown below: 
(OPERATIONAL-ERROR MOVE-HAND-TO-CRASP(ROCK) SERVO-ERROR) 
(OPERATIONAL-ERROR MOVE-HAND-TO-cRASP(ROCK) COLLISION) 
(OPERA:rIONAL-ERROR LJX:ATE(ROCK) INACCURACY) 
Knowledge about other types of failures is implicit in the action model 
as presented earlier. Any precondition, constraint, or needed 
information is recognized as a '[X)Ssible reason for failure by MEND. 
Figure 4. 3 below shows the corresrxmdence between the action model and 
the failure tree. 
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Fl (OPERATIONAL-ERROR MJVE-HAND-TO-GRASP (ROCK) SERVO-ERROR) 
F2 (OPERATIONAL-ERROR MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP(RCX::K) COLLISION) 
F3 (NEEDED MJVE-HAND-TO-GRASP (RCX::K) LOCATION (RCX::K) ) 
F4 (CONSTRAINT MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP (RCX::K) GRASPABLE (Rcx::K)) 
FS (PRECONDITION MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP(ROCK) F.MPI'Y-HAND) 
F6 (PRECONDITION MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP(RCX::K) OPEN-HAND) 
Molff • H~tJ~­
lo -(,fl:.l'l~i' 
'lhe knowledge necessary to eliminate some possibilities on the 
basis of their manifestation is highly domain dependent. '!his knowledge 
is incorporated in a procedure, the FRA-ROOTINE. The FRA-ROOTINE tests 
for the presence or absence of distinctive features of the failure in 
the current state of the world. 'Ihese tests indicate that certain 
failure reasons are impossible, that others are likely, and so on. 
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To see what the FRA-R::>urINE is all about let us consider what 
information about the manifestation of the failure of MOVE-f-lfu\lD...JI'O-GRASP 
can be used in constraining the set of failures. Figure 4.4 shows what 
the MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP' FRA-ROlJrINE does. At each node in the tree, a 
' 
condition is tested and the appropriate branch taken depending on the 
truth or falsity of the result. 'Ihe leaf nodes of the tree specify a 
list of failure reasons that are considered possible in that specific 
context. 'Ihe rationale for the results produced by the FRA-ROurINE is 
not justified here, but is discussed when some scenarios are described 
in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
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We note several important points about the FRA-ROurINE. "As with 
precondition testing, the conditions being tested are easily computed 
using the data in the world model and the feedback information. For 
instance, the condition NEAR-DESTINATION is checked by verifying that 
the final position of the hand is within a pre-specified limit of the 
planned destination. Similarly, PESV is checked by testing that the 
projection of the position error (the difference between the the actual 
position of the hand and the planned position) on the sliding vector 
exceeds a pre-set tolerance limit. 
Secondly, note that the routine illustrated in Figure 4.4 assumes 
that the preconditions EMPI'Y-HAND and OPb'N-HAND have been made true, and 
does not consider how failure resulting from falsity of these conditions 
will manifest itself. The reason that this is possible is that 
execution monitoring will catch these precondition errors and will not 
allow execution of this action to continue unless they have been 
satisfied. Also note that the FRA-ROurINE represents a procedural 
incorporation of knowledge about the manifestations of failure. 
It may seem unreasonable to make such assumptions or to embody such 
knowledge implicitly in procedures, when designing a general purpose 
system, but I believe it is essential to build in such simplifications 
when designing a practical system. It is perhaps appropriate to mention 
at this point that my philosophical viewpoint is that the flexibility of 
reasoning about actions from a declarative model can be carried only so 
far. A lot of discussion about declarative versus procedural 
representations is canpletely pointless since they are not considered in 
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the context of the goals of a well defined system. The decisions that 
were made in designing MEND are tailored to meet specific goals 
considered desirable for the JPL robot, with the consequence that MEND 
I 
cannot "reason" about certain aspects of its knowledge base. In a 
different context, Martin[74] voices a similar viewpoint, and points out 
in connection with the MACSYMA system that "the implications to the 
system design of facts like the cornmutability of plus are so great that 
the system must be built assuming them to be true". 
To get back to our discussion of the failure reason model. 'Ihere 
is a problem in using t..11e FHA-ROurINE to limit the set of failure 
reasons in step 3 of the algorithm presented in the previous section. 
'lhis is because this ~outine requires information about the state of the 
world in making its decisions. This means that previous states of the 
world need to be represented. To keep this information around would be 
quite unrealistic in any large system, even using a stack like mechanism 
for representing only the incremental changes. 
There are two ways of tackling this problem. Execution monitoring 
can be extended by running the FRA-ROurINE regardless of whether or not 
a failure occurred and marking the failure possibilities in the 
execution trace. Later, if failure reason analysis is necessitated in a 
subsequent action, this possibility list presents a "swrunary" useful for 
analysis. 
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A different strategy is to ignore the possibility of failure when 
there is no explicit triggering of the failure, and to later ask what 
failures could have escaped detection at the time of execution. This is 
answered by the representation of facts such as the one shown below, 
(PI'RIG (NEEDED MOVE-HAND-TO-<iRASP (ROCK) LO::ATION (ROCK) ) NTRIG) 
\.Vhere PI'RIG = POSSIBLE-TRIG:;ER 
and NTRIG = NULL-TRIGGER, 
\.Vhich says that a location error in the position of th,e rock could go 
untriggered when executing MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP. (The reason for this is 
that if the location error is sufficiently large, the hand will 
completely miss the object.) With these facts in hand, MEND can 
irrunediately determine the set of failure reasons to be considered in 
step 3 of the failure tree building algorithm, without having to run the 
FRA-ROUTINE for previously executed actions. 
An assumption implicit in the latter approach is that any triggered 
failure has already been dealt with. 1he first approach is a more 
general technique .but will perform unnecessary computations in 
situations where plans are successfully executed. 
There is one other aspect of the failure reason model which has 
nothing to with the analysis per se, but provides information about what 
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to do in case failure is attributed to a particular kind of failure. An 
example of this is shown below: 
(TO-CORRECT (OP-ERROR MHI'G(RCX:K) SERVO-ERROR) MHI'G-REC-PLANl(RCX:K)) 
where OP-ERROR = OPERATIONAL ERROR 
and MHTG-ROC-PIANl = (rock) 
BEGIN 
MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP (rock) 
END 
This says that to correct an operational error of servoing in 
MOVE-HAND....ir0-GRASP the plan MHTG-REX:-PIANl should be executed. 
MHTG-ROC-PLANl will attempt recovery by simple repositioning of the 
hand, and this is appropriate for servoing errors. In general, 
110-CORRECT steps are provided for each operational error. 
Constraint errors on the other hand have no such "imperative 
knowledge"[Goldstein 74] about what to do, since the robot does not have 
the capability to correct such failures. if failure is attributed to a 
constraint error, the plan is aborted and MEND seeks human aid. 
Precondition and information errors are not directly associated 
with corrective steps and are treated somewhat differently than 
operational errors. Since operational errors are local to the action 
under consideration, all that is needed is knowledge about how to fix 
the situation. For precondition errors the obvious thing is to 
reachieve the failed precondition before trying the action again. But 
before this can be done, some of the effects of the failed action must 
- 65 -
be undone. After the precondition has been achieved, other steps must 
be redone to get execution back on the right track. 'lhe PLAN-PATCHER in 
MEND implicitly incorporates this knowledge and recognizes that there 
are three parts to recovery from precondition errors undo certain 
effects, reachieve precondition, and redo the undone steps. Knowledge 
about what needs to be undone and what needs to be redone is part of the 
failure reason model. For example, 
(UNOO-STEPS (PROCONDITION GRASP (ROCK) wrrHIN-GRASP (ROCK)) OPEN) 
(REOO-STEPS (PRECONDITIOO GRASP (ROCK) WITHIN-GRASP (ROCK)) GRASP (ROCK) ) 
says that if failure in GRASP is attributed to the precondition error of 
the object not being WITHIN-GRASP, the OPEN undoes the effect of GRASP, 
and that GRASPing the object needs to be redone after WITHIN~RASP has 
been reachieved. 
'Ihe situation is entirely similar for information errors, with the 
one difference that instead of reachieving the precondition, the 
intermediate step between undoing and redoing is that of getting the 
needed information • . 
Facts such as these are used by the PLAN-PATCHER. We will describe 
how this works when discussing the scenarios that illustrate MEND's 
capabilities. 
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4.6 SCENARIOS 
In this section we look at several scenarios to illustrate how MEND 
copes with failures in simple manipulative tasks. 
4.6.1 An operational failure 
l..OCJITI: (£Jiek1) 
Consider the plan shown in Figure 4.5. en execution the action 
UX:ATE updates the \'K>rld model with the location, orientation, support 
level, and other details of RX:Kl. 'I.be fingers are then opened in 
preparation for the next action of positioning the hand around the 
object. Preconditions are checked and finding them to be true MEND 
computes a grasping orientation and interprets MOVE-HAND-'1'0-GRASP in 
terms of the primitive MOVE'.ID. 'I.be robot finds on execution of this 
action that tolerance criteria is not met and the primitive signals a 
failure by triggering 'IDLE~E-EXCEEDED. 
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MEND immediately recognizes the possibilities shown in Figure 4.3. 
FS and F6 are immediately eliminated from consideration since the 
preconditions were found to be true before execution. 'Ihe FRA-ROurINE 
associated with MOVE-HAN0-1ro-GRASP is then run. Since only a tolerance 
error was triggered this routine returns SERVO-ERROR (Fl) as the only 
possibility. The FRA-ROurINE eliminates COLLISION (F2) because there 
was no SATURATION, which is a second way in which the primitive MOVE'ID 
can trigger failure. (We are using saturation of the joint motors 
driving the manipulator as a sensor. Proximity sensors [Johnston 74] 
will more effectively provide information about $UCh situations by 
detecting impending collisions.) lDCATION-ERROR (F3) and J:iOI'-GRASPABLE 
(F4) are not impossible, but are considered to be unlikely in the 
absence of saturation. 'I.he rationale behind this is that a location 
error in the object to be grasped or largeness of the object (making it 
NOI'-GRASPABLE) are likely to cause the hand to bump onto the rock, 
causing one of the joints to saturate. 
of't:.it.A11otJftL. F-ltltol.. 
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In any case, the result of running the FRA-OOurINE is that the 
failure tree is pruned to the simpler structure shown in Figure 4.6. 
Since the error is an operational error, the PIAN-PA'ICHER looks for the 
TO-CORRECT plan associated with SERVO-ERROR in the failure reason model 
of MOVE-HAND-'I'O-GRASP. The corrective step is patched in and the 
modified plan is shown in Figure 4.7. MOVE-HA.ND-TO-GRASP will be 
interpreted in exactly the same way as before, with the result that the 
corrective step is equivalent to repositioning the hand. 
4.6.2 An information error 
Consider a small change to the previous scenario and assume that 
the hand actually bumped onto the rock. Also assume that the rock had 
been previously picked up indicating that it is both GRASPABLE and 
MOVABLE. This time failure is triggered by two conditions -- SATURATION 
and TOLERANCE-EXCEEDED. SATURATION indicates that one of the motors 
driving the manipulator saturated because the movement of the hand was 
obstructed in some way. 
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~ before MEND starts with the possibilities represented in Figure 
4.3. However, in this case verification of the preconditions and 
constraints eliminate 001'-GRASPABLE (F4), NOI'-EMPTY-HAND (F5) , and 
OOI'~PEN-HAND (F5) [Figure 4.8]. SATURATION indicates that coilision 
into an obstacle has to be considered a possibility, but FRA-ROurINE 
eliminates this. by verifying that the hand is near the object to be 
grasped. Fl and F3 representing servo error and object location error 
respectively can both cause the hand to bt.nnp onto the rock, but their 
manifestations are slightly different. By looking at the position error 
along the sliding vector MEND can tell the difference. If such a 
positional error is found, it irrlicates that there was a servoing error. 
On the other hand its absence indicates that there was no servoing error 
and that failure must be attributed to other reasons. Let us consider 
the latter situation, the result being the elimination of SERVO-ERROR 
(Fl). The possibilities are now represented by the structure shown in 
Figure 4. 9. 
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Since F3 represents an infonnation error, MEND continues the 
analysis by looking back at the execution trace for an action which 
either FIND's or PROVIDE's the desired information about (LO:ATION 
ROCKl). By simple pattern matching this action is identified as 
LOCATE (RCX::Kl). MEND looks for reasons for failure in LOCATE 's failure 
reason model and finds: 
(PI'RIG (OPERATIONAL-ERROR I.DCATE(RCX::K) INACCURACY) NTRIG) 
This fact indicates that the inaccuracy in LOCATE may go undetected. 
'Ihe failure tree after this part of the analysis is shown in Figure 
4.10. 
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FlGURE 4.10 
'Ille PIAN-PA'ICHER uses the explanation represented by the failure 
tree in Figure 4.10 to determine the recovery plan. 'lhe UNOO-STEPS and 
REOO-STEPS associated with the information failure in MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP 
shown below, 
(UNOO-STEPS (NEEDED MHTG (ROCK) LOCATION (ROCK)) NULL-PLAN) 
(REDO-STEPS (NEEDED MH'ffi (ROCK) LOCATION (ROCK)) MH'ffi (ROCK)) 
are used to correct the failure by patching together the plan shown in 
Figure 4.11. 
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Continuing the recovery planning by looking at F3-·LOCATE-F7 in the 
failure tree, the PLAN-PATCHER corrects the operational error in locate 
by using, 
(TO-CORRECT (OPERATIONAL-ERROR U:X:ATE(RCCK) INACCURACY) IJJC-ACC(RCX::K)) 
where LOC-ACC : (rock) 
BEGIN 
APPROACH (rock) : 
LCX:ATE-REIATIVE-TO-HAND (rock) 
END 
to modify the structure in Figure 4.11. to that shown in Figure 4.12. 
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4.6.3 An anamolous situation 
--- -- ----- -----
Assume that the recovery plan of Figure 4.12 is put into execution, 
arrl that the hand again bumps onto the rock. If we consider a similar 
situation to that in section 4.6.2, then MEND would continue the 
analysis represented in the tree of Figure 4.9 by producing the failure 
tree shown in Figure 4.13 instead of that shown in Figure 4.10. 'Ihe 
reason for this is that the search for the action which provided the 
information about the location of RCX:Kl will now find the recovery 
action LCX::ATE-REIATIVE-TO-HAND rather than the original LCX::ATE. Since 
there are no known failures for UJCATE-RELATIVE-TO-HAND, the chain of 
failure reasons G-F3-? is found to be inappropriate, and MEND has no 
way of explaining the failure. In such anamolous situations, MEND 
aborts the plan arrl seeks human aid in planning the recovery. 
4. 6.:_! Mul ~iple explanations 
Ol'E~/111!;,NAL !;:.~~~ 
SL1t>C·oor 
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We consider the plan shown in Figure 4.5 again. Asstnne that 
MOVE-HAND-To-GRASP does not trigger any failure, and that GRASP fails to 
find the object. 'Ihe failure tree after analysis is shown in Figure 
4.14. 
Figure 4.14 shows too PJSsible explanations. In such cases, the 
PIAN-PA'ICHER uses a pre-stored severity code with each failure reason to 
choose an explanation. 'Ihe precondition error in GRASP has the greater 
severity code, and G-F2-F3-F4 is the preferred explanation. The 
corrected pla~ is shown in Figure 4.15. 
MOVf.-HA/JfJ-To-
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FIGURE 4-.15 
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4.6.5 Constraint error 
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Figure 4.16 shows a plan which will result in RCX:K2 being placed on 
a viewing station. Assume that the rock is not movable. TRANSPORT will 
trigger failure through SATURATION. 'Ihe possible reasons for failure 
are shown in Figure 4.17. 
FIGUK,E 4./ 7 
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Assuming that preconditions have been verified, F5 and F6 can be 
el irninated. 'lhe TRANSFORT FRA-ROlITINE will immediately remove F3 from 
consideration, because it will find that the hands touch sensors are 
still activated. Finding that the hand has not moved, Fl and F2 are 
rejected as possible reasons for failure. This leaves F4, the 
constraint error, as the only possible ex?lanation. 'lhe plan is 
aborted, since nothing can be done about constraint errors. 
4.7 COMMENI'S AND CCMPARISONS 
'lhe main advantage of failure reason analysis as presented here is 
that it provides a method of directly focussing attention on the source 
of the failure, by using knowledge about actions, the manner in which 
they fail, and the history of previous actions. 
Traditionally robot systems have merely dealt with the problem by 
trying to plan to the "nearest" intermediate subgoal, as for instance in 
the SHA.KEY system. 'lhis method places the entire burden of recovery 
from failures on the planner and no advantage is taken of the the 
information implicit in the reason for failure. In this context of 
planning, we can think of the results of failure reason analysis as 
constraining the search space of solutions that the planner has to deal 
with. 
Sussman has tackled the problem of failure reason analysis but in a 
slightly different context. The reason for (or underlying cause of) 
failures that he considers are domain independent goal interactions, 
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occuring because of incomplete knowledge about the Y.Qrld. MEND assumes 
that knowledge about the Y.Qrld is correctly represented in the system 
and further that the plan being executed is conceptually correct. 
Nevertheless failures occur because of operational errors of various 
sorts, something which is not dealt with by Sussman in the HACKER 
system. 
Similar comments apply to Goldstein's system MYCROFT[Goldstein 74) 
which debugs programs in the turtle world of line drawings. An 
additional difference is that there is no real notion of execution 
monitoring. Execution proceeds to completion and failure to produce the 
desired line drawing is detected at the very end. 
Sacerdoti[75] gives an example of NOAH's approach towards error 
recovery. 'Ihe hierarchical approach taken in identifying the reason for 
failure is perhaps the best that can be done when no knowledge is 
available about why actions fail and how such failure manifests itself. 
But, I believe that it is possible to build in such knowledge into any 
system, to effectively aid the planner in deciding what to do. 
Sacerdoti also discusses a problem involving tx:>Stconditions, arrl 
its use in execution monitoring. He points out as an example that a 
robot should check that a pulley it has installed does not wobble. The 
FINISH-UP-ROUTINES in MEND are expressly intended to check 
postcorrlitions. Furthermore, if the reason for the wobble is considered 
to be completely local to the installation process, it can be handled 
trivially in MEND by modelling the wobble as an operational error in the 
INSTALL-PULLEY action, and by providing appropriate recovery procedures. 
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In fact, if we consider the wobble to be an unlikely event then we can 
even allow the robot to continue its assembly task and wait for the 
wobble to manifest itself, and then correct the problem. 
Certainly the major limitation in MEND is the simple minded 
approach taken by the PLAN-PATCHER. It has no real understanding of why 
its plans work and merely pieces together these actions. Furthermore, 
it has no concept of the the higher level goals to which the plan is 
addressed (as for instance, that a rock is being picked up and 
transported to an instrument station and measurements are going to be 
taken, etc.). In this respect, the Haye's system and Sacerdoti's 
system, NOAH, are far better, and something like those mechanisms are 
necessary in making MEND adaptable to rrore complex domains. 
In tracing back precondition errors (or information errors), MEND 
reasons that the precondition is not true, perhaps because it was never 
achieved by a previous action. Restricting failure reason analysis to 
only this kind of reasoning has certain limitations that are discussed 
next. 
A simple case .that is not handled by MEND is one in which a 
precondition is achieved but later destroyed by the execution of a 
subsequent step. It would not be too difficult to consider extendirlg 
the tree building program to look for actions which may destroy a 
precondition established by a previous step. However, before making 
such an extension, we can ask whether it is really necessary for the 
kind of system we have in mind. I think that the need for such a 
mechanism is doubtful because such interactions problems should have 
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been avoided in the first place when planning the task. 
In a dynamic world, preconditions could become false as a 
consequence of the activities of other agents of change. We know very 
little about how to take account of the intentions of other agents who 
may or may not cooperate in the execution of tasks, and extensions in 
this direction are 1 ikely to be quite difficult. 
Finally, it would be roc>re appropriate to deal with a certain subset 
of precondition errors as mechanism failures. If we find that a car 
cannot be driven to the airport, we could attribute the failure to a 
precondition error (or constraint error) of the car being Nor-DRIVABLE. 
It does not make sense to ask whether any previous action was taken to 
make the car DRIVABLE. The roc>re appropriate question is what in the 
mechanism of the car has failed and why it caused the failure. It \'X>uld 
then be possible to deal with the failure of the cars by fixing, for 
' instance, the carburetor instead of finding alternative means of 
transportation. Rieger[76] has developed schemes for representing the 
functioning of mechanisms, and these can perhaps be used for recovery 
from mechanism failures. Extensions to handle these cases will be 
useful for the JPL robot, where we could imagine situations in which the 
robot responds to failure by replacing the hand affixed to the 
manipulator by another. 
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MULTIPLE OUTC0'1E ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed one approach to the error recovery 
problem. Failure reason analysis attempts to find an explanation for 
the failure. 'llle actions to be taken to recover fro~ the failure were 
derived in a relatively straightforward manner from the failure tree 
representing the results of the analysis. 
This chapter suggests an alternative view of the problem. The 
historical cause of the failure is deemphasized. In contrast, attention 
is focussed on the actual state of the world after failure has occurred, 
and on how this state differs from the expected state of the ....urld. 
In order for a system like MEND to capitalize on this in 
formulating recovery from errors, it needs a model of what the outcomes 
of an action can be, how to tell them apart, and finally what can be 
done about it. 1his model will be referred to as the multiple outcome 
model and in the current implementation is implicit in a MOA-ROtJrINE 
associated with each action. 
The main computational steps in the process of multiple outcome 
analysis are shown in the Figure 5.1. We will merely illustrate 
multiple outcome analysis by discusssing recovery from failure in 
r-K)VE-HAND--T<H:;RASP and GRASP. 
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5.2 AN EXAMPLE : M:>VE- HAND-'1"0-GRASP 
Failure reason analysis for MOVE-HAND-To-GRASP has already been 
illustrated in chapter 4. Here we will consider multiple outcome 
analysis for the same action. A subsequent section will compare these 
two schemes and suggest ways of integrating the two techniques. 
5.2.1 The set of possible cases 
'lhe set of possible outcomes of an action constitutes the first 
aspect of the multiple outcome model. The classification of the 
possible states of the world resulting from execution of 
MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP into qualitatively distinct outcomes is shown in 
Figure 5. 2. 
CA.<; E 1 : LEFT TOVCll 
- 83 -
L 
CA~!!. z.: fl..\GkT TOVcH 
S : $\.\'PIN<:.- VC::LTO r_ · 
For reasons of clarity the graphical representation shows only 
two-dimensional picture of the hand, though the implementation is 
designed to handle the three-dimensional. case. Each category represents 
an infinity of possible situations, but it is easy to qualitatively 
distinguish between the cases. LEFT-TOUCH and RIGHT-'roUCH are identical 
except for the fact that the finger in contact with the object is the 
left finger in case 1 and the right finger in case 2. We define the 
left finger to be that which lies in the direction of the sliding 
vector. IX)UBLE~roucH occurs when both fingers contact an object which 
is wider than the ma:ximum finger separation. 
way of grasping the object in that particular 
In such a case there is no 
orientation. PALM-TOUCH 
can occur only with an object whose height is greater than the length of 
the fingers. The IN-GRA.SP case is only marginally erroneous in that the 
hand bt.nnps into the ground because of overshoot. Finally, OUTSIDE-GRASP 
is a catchall which captures all cases where the object is not within 
grasp. No special significance is to be attached to the fact that the 
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object is shown on the right of the hand in the figure for this 
particular case. 
It is important to ask why we do not include cases such as the one 
shown in Figure 5.,3. 
L 
NOi EM.,rY H.ANb 
Clearly cases 1 - 6 are ones which can occur only when the finger are 
completely open. This suffices for our purposes since precondition 
testing will verify that the fingers are open. If not, an action will 
be executed which will result in opening the fingers. 
5.2.2 Feedback information and anal~sis of cases 
1bere are two steps to the process of distinguishing between 
possible outcomes. The first is the analysis of tirunediately available 
information and the second is the acquiring of new information necessary 
for analysis. Both of these steps are based on knowledge about 
distinctive features of each outcane and this knowledge is again part of _ 
the multiple outcome model. 
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Feedback information that is relevant for the analysis of failure 
in the MOVE-HAND-T~RASP is given by the hand state descriptor. Among 
other things it specifies the coordinates of the hand and the state of 
the touch sensors. Combined with data about the object, this 
inforrration can be used t o eliminate some of the six cases from 
consideration. We know, for example, in case 1 that the coordinates of 
the hand must be approximately the same as the height of the object. If 
this is not the case, then clear ly we net.:.d not consider this cqse any 
longer . 
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Figure 5. 4 above summarizes the relationships between test 
conditions and outcomes. A "l" in the ( i, j) th entry in the table 
indicates that test condition T(i) must be true of outcome O(j), and a 
"-1" indicates that T(i) must not be true. Several algorithms are 
possible for using the information in the table in eliminating choices 
from consideration. 
'lhe algorithm implemented in MEND is graphically 
depicted in Figure 5. 5. 
E L.l Ml N lrf.E 
-t 
+ 
FIGURE. S.5 
'lhis algorithm works by eliminating choices on the basis of tests 
performed sequentially. Certain tests will be unnecessary in that they 
will eliminate cases which have already been dropped from consideration. 
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The result of this process of analysing the feedback information is 
a smaller set of possible outcomes. If the number of cases has been 
limited to a single case then recovery planning can be initiated without 
any further step. It is possible though that the set of possible 
outcomes is larger than one. Under these circumstances MEND cannot plan 
the recovery. It needs to acquire more information than is immediately 
available through feedback, to further distinguish between the cases. 
This will be the subject of the next section. 
5.2.3 Acquiring information and further analysis 
'Ihe information available directly through feedback will in cases 
be inadequate for the purposes of identifying the state of the world as 
one of the predefined set of possible outcomes. In such cases selected 
actions can be executed to acquire more information. 
CKle of the things that the robot can do to find out the state of 
the world after failure in MOVE-HAND-'1'0-GRASP is to use vision. 'lbere 
are both conceptual and pragmatic reasons for avoiding this. 'Ihe 
conceptual objection is that a universal mechanism is being applied 
without any attempt to make maximal use of the information that is 
already available. A partial step towards avoiding this would be to 
make available to the vision system a model of what it can expect to 
find. In this particular case this model will be the set of possible 
outcomes of the MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP action, restricted by the analysis of 
feedback information. However, the use of such models in simplifying 
the complexity of vision analysis is not a very well understood problem. 
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From a pragmatic point of view, the vision system that is currently 
part of the robot is a complex program which is slow in yielding 
results. 'Ihus it makes sense to avoid use of vision if information can 
be acquired by other rreans which are simpler from a practical point of 
view. Figure 5.6 shows the tests appropriate for the 
MOVE-HAND-'1'0-GRASP. The tests are all simple ARM actions that yield 
useful information. 
LJ:-FT !3tJMl' 
IE.Sr 
FtGU~f~ 5.f, 
'lbe TOUCH-TEST simply closes the fingers and checks whether the 
touch sensors are activated. The LEFT-BUMP-TE.ST moves the hand up by a 
small amount, moves "left" along the sliding vector by an amount equal 
to the finger separation, and then moves down. If the hand bumps onto 
something at a non trivial distance above the ground, then the test 
gives a positive result. The RIGHT-BUMP-TEST is analogous, with the 
hand being moved in the opposite direction. 
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If IN-GRASP or PAI..M-TOUCH [Figure 5. 2] belong to the set of 
possibilities, then the TOUCH~TEST is applied. If the object is 
detected by the touch sensors, MEND recognizes that the problem has been 
solved, and no rrore tests are performed. If the touch sensors are not 
activated, then the above two cases IN-GRASP and PAL.~-TOUCH are 
eliminated from the set of possibilities. Regardless of the result of 
the test, the fingers are opened. The other tests can give 
unpredictable results if OUTSIDE-GRASP is among the set of 
possibilities. In such circumstances, MEND resorts to vision. If 
OUTSIDE-GRASP has been eliminated by analysis of feedback information 
and LEFT-TOUCH belongs to the set of PJSsible outcanes, then the 
LEFT-BUMP-TEST is run. If the test gives a positive result, then case 2 
(RIGHT-TOUCH) is eliminated. Otherwise, case 1 (LEFT-TOOCH) case is 
removed from consideration. If any further analysis is required, then 
the RIGIT-BUMP-TEST is run. 
5.2.4 Recovery planning 
Dynamic information gathering introduces a difficulty in that the 
actions taken to acquire information change the state of the world. 
'Ihus one of the criteria to be placed on the information gathering 
actions is that their effects be simple to characterize. Further, these 
actions should have a high probability of success and should not cause 
any failures of their own. 
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'Ihe state changes that result do not necessarily make the recovery 
steps more complex. In fact,. there are cases when the information 
gathering steps actually produce desirable side effects. For example if 
the result of the '!OUCH-TEST is positive, MEND has not only identified 
the error state but has further achieved a state from which success in 
grasping the object can be almost guaranteed. 
Figure 5. 7 shows the recovery actions to be taken on identification 
of the error state. 'Ihey need no detailed explanation, and the only 
point to note is the following: 'rhe parameter for the search routines 
specifies the starting point of the search. By noting the hand state 
when the failure occurred and using it as the starting point of the 
search, the search strategies can be made independent of any information 
gathering steps that may have been executed. 
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5.2.5 Anamolous Situations 
In our discussion in the previous sections, we have ignored the 
possibility of several kinds of anamolous situations. The first kind of 
anamolous situation that can occur is the elimination of all tx>ssible 
cases. This can happen because of two distinct reasons. The model of 
possible outcanes that MEND has been provided with may not be 
comprehensive in categorizing all situations, or the information on 
which the analysis is based may be erroneous. Whatever the reason, 
finding a null set of possibilities, MEND will abort the recovery 
planning. 
'Ihe possibility of keeping a record of the tests per formed and 
their effects in eliminating cases has been considered. Such a record 
would allow MEND to deal with anamolous situations by reconsidering 
certain outcomes that have been eliminated from consideration. 
L 
A second kind of anamolous situation arises when MEND's analysis 
points to a catalogued case which is somewhat different from the actual 
situation. For instance, MEND will respond to the situation illustrated 
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in Figure 5.8 by a SFARCH-LEFT recovery strategy, imagining it to be a 
simple LEFT-'IDUCH situation. However, the recovery plan will fail 
because the object is too large and hence not graspable. 
5. 3 A SOCOND EXAMPLE : GRASP 
In general, the set of IJOSsible failure outcanes of GRASP are not 
very well definL>d. However, in cases where the failure is the result of 
the operational error SLIDE-Our, the failure outcanes to be considered 
are shown in Figure 5. 9. 
x 
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(In contrast to the previous figures, we show a "side" view of the hand 
in which we see the outside face of the fingers. The small cross in the 
middle of the fingers indicates that the sliding vector is pointing away 
fran the reader.) The rationale behind the outcomes shown in figure 5. 9 
is graphically illustrated in Figure 5.10. 
Feedback data does not provide any useful information in 
distinguishing between the two cases. 'Ihus a dynamic information 
gathering step PI'SV-BUMP-TEST is resorted to. This test and its effects 
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are illustrated in Figure 5.11. 'lhe fingers are not opened before this 
test is executed and this has the advantage of making the outcanes of 
this test simple and well defined. 
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'Ihe Pl'SV-BUMP..JI'EST indicates whether or not the object is to the 
left or right of the hand viewed with respect to the sliding vector. 
'Ihe corrective stefG are to open the hand and then to move the hand to 
grasp the rock at its newly estimated location. 
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5.4 FAILURE REASON ANALYSIS VERSUS MULTIPLE OUTCCME ANALYSIS 
MEND uses both failure reason analysis and multiple outcome 
analysis in tackling the error recovery problem. 'Ihese schemes are not 
to be thought of as competing strategies. Rather they complement each 
other in natural way, suggesting a possible integration of the two 
schemes. I.et us first make a comparison of the two schemes. 
To make our comparison concrete we again consider the performance 
of failure reason analysis and multiple outcome analysis for 
MOVE-HAND-TO-GRASP. Consider a case in which the hand bumps into the 
object to be grasped and FRA (the failure reason analyzer in MEND) 
concludes that the failure is the result of a location error. 'Ihe 
recovery based on this analysis locates the object more accurately and 
attempts to reposition the hand around the object. 'Ihis is quite 
satisfactory in the sense that it solves the problem. It is 
unsatisfactory, however, for two reasons. Firstly, it does not make 
maximal use of the available feedback information. Secondly, it does 
not recognize that the important thing for recovery is the relative 
[X>Sition of the object with respect to the hand, regardless of the 
reason for the failure. 
Multiple outcome analysis exploits the availability of feedback 
information, and goes even further by acquiring necessary but missing 
information. With such analysis it is possible to characterize the 
relation between the hand and the object even without accurate 
information about the location of the object. Such a characterization 
would be pointless if the robot had to eventually determine the location 
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of the object (using vision) in order to effect recovery. '!his is not 
the case, as the earlier example 'has shown, and MEND can suggest the use 
of specialized actions which are simple and which achieve the immediate 
goal of positioning the hand around the object. 
The situation is not as one sided as the above argument may 
indicate. A characterization of the current state of the world on the 
basis of a detailed analysis may be unnecessarily expensive. For 
instance, an operational error of servoing can be corrected by simple 
repositioning of the hand. By ignoring the reason for failure MEND 
engages in a needless analysis which may involve dynamic information 
gatheririg. Multiple outcane analysis is therefore deficient in not 
making use of the history of the process that resulted in the current 
state . 
5.5 INTEGRATION OF THE 'lWO SCHF.MFS 
'Ihe above argument clearly indicates the need for integration of 
the two schemes. This has been done in MEND in a rather simple and ad 
hoc manner. MEND always begins by performing failure reason analysis. 
The results are sent over to DECIDER (Figure 3.2), which has a rather 
arbitrary classification of failure reasons into two categories of 
SIMPLE and COMPLEX. For the cases in which the failure reason has a 
SIMPLE recovery strategy, multiple outcome analysis is not performed. 
In other cases, MEND resorts to multiple outcome analysis, hoping to 
find a simpler recovery strategy. For the example we have been 
considering, SERVO-ERROR is considered a SIMPLE error and MEND recovers 
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by rei;x>sitioning the hand. Multiple outcome analysis is not done. On 
the other hand location errors aLe tackled by multiple outcome analysis. 
We have a rather ad hoc scheme based on our knowledge of what is 
SIMPLE and what is not. It seems unlikely that there are any general 
criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of these schemes so that this 
criteria can be used as the basis for integration. 'Ibis is because it 
is the specific properties of the task domain which determine the 
effectiveness of one strategy versus another. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6 .1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation has addressed itself to a specific problem facej 
by a robot , system -- namely, that of recovering from failures in 
execution of a plan of actions. Failures occur partly because the robot 
operates in a domain which cannot be characterized exactly and partly 
because actions the robot takes do not always function as expected. 
Execution of plans needs to be monitored in order to detect errol'."s. 
A very conservative execution monitoring strategy would check a large 
nullber of conditions in an exhaustive manner to avoid failures at all 
costs. Such an approach tends to make robot systems impractical. TI.1is 
suggests that execution monitoring should be restricted to simple 
checks, and that mechanisms should be provided for dealing with failures 
as and when they occur. 
Traditionally, robot systems with automated planners deal with 
failures that have been detected by merely replanning to achieve the 
desired goal. A somewhat different appr\lach has been taken in this 
study, and this approach provides some simple and effective techniques 
for dealing with the problem of error recovery. 
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6.2 HISTORICAL N0rE 
The subject of error recovery was investigated in connection with 
the JPL robotics research program. Manipulative tasks proved to be a 
rich enough domain to illustrate several interesting aspects of this 
problem. The problem was tackled by designing a module called MEND, to 
be integrated with the existing robot software. A first version of MEND 
embodied a sim~ler scheme for error recovery than the one described in 
this report. This first implementation directed attention to certain 
limitations of the system, spurring a more detailed study of the 
problem. The results of this detailed study have been subsequently 
incorporated in the design of a second version of MEND, which is not yet 
an integral part of the JPL robot system. 
6.3 A DISCUSSION OF THE APPROACH 
------ ------
The approach taken in MEND is quite different from the traditional 
manner in which the problem of error recovery has been tackled. Let us 
take a look at the differences. 
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We can irnag ine the execution of a task as a sequence of 
transformations which changes the world from an initial state, S(0), 
into a final state, S(n), which represents the goal of the robot. 
Figure 6.1 depicts the intermediate states of t he transformations from 
the 8(0) to S(n) which result from the execution of a plan of actions, 
A(eJ) • • • A(n-1). Assume that a failure is detected on execution of the 
action A(i). This means that the robot recognizes that the action A(i) 
has not produced the exr;:ected state S(i+l), but rather has resulted in 
some failure state S(f). 
I 
'Ihe problem of error recovery is that of going from the failure 
state S(f) to the goal state S(n). Typically other robot systems treat 
S(f) as though it were some arbitrary state and respond to the failure 
by replanning to achieve the given goal. In such an approach there is 
no essential difference between error recovery [the transformation from 
S(f) to S(n)] and planning [for instance, the transformations from S(0) 
to S(n)]. Parts of the old plan can sometimes be reused, as for 
instance, by replanning from S(f) to S(j) so that the original plan can 
be used to go from S(j) to S(n). 
The central idea in failure reason analysis is that finding an 
explanation of the failure, i.e., understanding why action A(i) resulted 
in the state S (f) , can focus attention on where the problem lies and 
what can be done about it. With this viewpoint error recovery is seen 
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as something quite different from traditional planning in that we do not 
ask: 
What can be done to go from S (f) to s (n}? 
but rather ask: 
Why did action A(i) result in the state S(f)?. 
Of course, even if we do understand why the failure occurred, we 
are still confron1fd with the problem of going from the state S (f) to 
S(n). ME."'ND shows that even very simple strategies are effective in 
solving this latter problem, once an explanation for the failure has 
been found. 
Where does multiple outcome analysis fit in all this? Again, as in 
failure reason analysis, S(f) is recognized as being something special 
and not an arbitrary state of the .world. Since we know that S (f) 
resulted from the execution of an action, with a good model of the 
behavior of the action, we can determine the state S(f). Specifically, 
the action model predicts that S(f) is one of S(fl) ••• S(fm), and the 
\ 
problem in multiple outcane analysis is that of characterizing the state 
s (f) • '!his is done by looking for distinguishing features that 
characterize the failure states. The planning problem has been made 
trivial by including recommendations of corrective steps as part of the 
multiple outcome model of actions. 
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6.4 FEATURES OF THE SOLlTfION 
MEND's performance as part of the robot system is based on the fact 
that it monitors the execution of plans and detects failures. We 
discuss this and then outline the two strategies used by MEND in 
recovering from failures. 
/ 
"Any system which attempts to recover from errors should have the 
capability of detecting errors. A robot should thus be able to judge 
the progress of activities in leading towards a pre-specified goal. 
Such monitoring of activities, however, should not be so prohibitively 
expensive that the robot is paralyzed by indecision. 
MEND implements a simple execution monitoring strategy. 
Precondition testing in the INITIATE-ROUI'INEs incorrx>rates knowledge 
about what can be tested easily and what cannot. MEND allows execution 
to proceed even when some preconditions have not been absolutely 
verified. However, these are noted down in the execution trace as being 
unverified so that the information can be later used in analyzing 
failure. 
Errors are detected at two distinct levels of the system. At the 
hardware level, completion criteria provide the simplest test of 
success. Given success of the action at this level, software checks of 
certain simple conditions allow the detection of another class of 
errors. Tne FINISH-UP-ROurINEs are selective in applying only those 
tests which can be guaranteed to give results inexpensively. MEND again 
sacrifices completeness for efficiency, and allows certain errors to go 
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undetected. 'Ihese errors are often detected in a sirn?le way at 
subsequent steps in the execution of the plan. 
does not suffer significantly in spite of 
detecting errors. 
'Ihus MEND's performance 
its simple approach in 
'Ihe history of actions taken by the robot, the current state of the 
world, and the nature of the failure are all pieces of information that 
are useful in determining the cause of the failure. A classification of 
failure reasons into four basic types -- operational errors, information 
errors, precondition errors, and ~onstraint errors -- proves useful in 
deali119 with failures intelligently. 
MEND analyzes the failure by building a failure tree to represent 
the possible explanations for failure. Several constraints are used to 
limit the set of all JX>Ssible explanations. By keeping a record of 
unverified preconditions, MEND can eliminate verified preconditions as 
possible reasons for the failure. Knowledge about the manifestation of 
the failure is used to further limit the set of fX>SSibilities. Finally, 
some explanations are shown to be imrx>ssible on the basis of the history 
of actions. 
Having found an explanation of the failure, MEND patches a recovery 
plan based on very simple strategies appropriate to the different kinds 
of failures. Even such simple strategies prove adequate in producing 
recovery plans which are contextually appropriate. 
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6.4.3 Multiple outcome ~alysis 
MEND's capabilities are significantly enhanced by a second scheme 
of error recovery. This is based on a detailed model of the possible 
states of the world when an error has occurred. The states resulting 
from the execution of an action are characterized into a small number of 
qualitatively distinct outcomes. 
MEND analyzes feedback information in limiting the set of possible 
cases. A sequence of prefabricated tests eliminate cases from 
consideration. Often such analysis will be adequate to identify the 
outcomes of an action, in which case MEND has all the information it 
needs to plan recovery. 
'I'here are cases, however, when such analysis is inadequate to trim 
the choices do\>m to a single case. Under these circumstances Mh"""'ND 
executes actions as a means of gathering specific information that is 
useful in further disambiguating the choices. 
The result of the analysis is the 
outcome. Each failure outcome is 
id en tif ica ti on 
associated with 
recovery strategy, so that recovery from the failure 
immediate. 
of 
an 
is 
the failure 
appropriate 
simple and 
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6. 5 CONTRIBlJrIONS 
The techniques of planning recovery from failures through failure 
reason analysis and multiple outcome analysis are contributions to the 
subject of robotics. fibre importantly, however, the problem of error 
recovery is recognized to be a member of a larger class of problems 
involving knowledge representation and common sense reasoning, both of 
which are core topics in the study of artificial intelligence. The 
solution presented in this thesis makes some new contributions to these 
core topics. 
In regard to knowledge representations, this study has established 
certain guidelines for the structuring of knowledge about actions. 
Traditionally, actions have been simply modelled in terms of 
preconditions arrl postconditions.. This study has shown that by 
extending the model of actions to include a failure reason model and a 
multiple outcane model, a robot can more directly address itself to the 
problem of error recovery. 
'!he failure reason model is a means of representing the knowledge 
about why actions fail, knowledge about their manifestation, and finally 
knowledge about what can be done to correct failures. '!he 
classification of failure reasons is useful in structuring the knowledge 
about actions into categories that can each be easily and separately 
dealt with. 
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The multiple outcome model represents the possible outcomes of an 
action, knowledge about how they can be distinguished, and about what 
can be done about them. Such a model provides a systematic way of 
exploiting feedback information, that is typically available in any 
robot system. 
Failure reason analysis and multiple outcome analysis can be viewed 
in rather general terms as specialized techniques for performing common 
sense reasoning appropriate for planning recovery from failures. 'Ihe 
above models form an essential part of the knowledge base necessary for 
such reasoning. 
6.6 FUTURE WORK 
'l'he results reported in this thesis provide a solution to the 
problem of error recovery in robot systems that are relatively simple in 
some respects. Even for more complex robot systems, the techniques of 
failure reason analysis and multiple outcome analysis are likely to be 
very useful, but the limitations of MEND suggest directions for future 
efforts. 
'Ihe recovery strategies investigated have been 1 imited to those 
which achieve the intended effects of the failed action. More 
generally, an intelligent robot will have to -consider trying other 
alternatives which may equally well achieve the goal. For instance, 
finding that a rock cannot 
collection may look for 
be moved, a robot interested in sample 
another rock with similar properties. Such 
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strategies require a- representation of the larger set of goals to which 
a specific plan is addressed. Failure reason analysis is likely to play 
an important role in planning recovery, even in robot systems with more 
complex goal structures than the ones considered in this study. 
In general, recovery planning becomes expensive if 
abandons the whole plan because of a failure in one step. 
the robot 
By keeping 
interrelationships between different steps in the plan in an explicit 
form, it is possible to restructure and build upon the old plan in 
planning recovery. 
investigated but 
Sane preliminary ideas in this direction have been 
they need to be implemented as part of the system 
before it is becomes clear how well such a scheme will 'W'Ork. 
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APPENDIX 2 
A CCMBINATORIAL PROBLEM 
In multiple outcome analysis we are interested in identifying the 
failure state as one of a preconceived set of possible outcomes of an 
action. Identification involves the testing of conditions that allow 
one outcorre to be distinguished from another. From a theoretical 
standpoint one could ask for the minimum number of tests that need to be 
perfo rmed. This problem can be formulated in combinatorial terms, and 
1 
has applications in wide variety of situations. 
Let S be a set of n states, Sl, S2, ••• , Sn, and let The a set 
of m tests, Tl, T2, •.• , 'fut. _ Construct a matrix A of m rows and n 
columns with entries (-1, 0, 1) in the following manner: 
A(i, j) = 1 
A(i. , j) = -1 
A(i, j) = 0 
if test Ti = TRUE in state Sj 
if test Ti = FALSE in state Sj 
otherwise. 
We define such a matrix to be sufficient if: 
Vj Vk 3i ( (A ( i, j) = 1) and_ A (i, k) 
l~j~n l<k<,n l ' i<m -
k-tj 
(A( i, j) = -1 
= -1) or 
and A( i, k) = 1)) 
The intuitive interpretation of t he above definition is that the set of 
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tests is sufficient, if for any pair of states there exists at least one 
test which gives different results, thus allowing the states to be 
distinguished one from the other. 
Given a matrix A, the problem under consideration is that of 
finding a sutmatrix B (formed by deleting rows of A) with m' rows and n 
colt.nnns, which is sufficient and has a minimal number of rows. Many 
interestirg questions about the properties of such a minimal matrix 
arise, but we are primarily interested in a an efficient computational 
procedure that will find such a minimal sutmatrix. 
